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INTRODUCTION
 
Recently it has been recognized that the United
 
States federal government is no longer limiting its func
 
tions to the mere protection of the so-called inalienable
 
rights of the people. The Great Depression prior to the
 
Second World War; the inadequacy of the economic theory of
 
the invisible hand as a remedy for economic woes; the increas
 
ing population coupled with scarcity of resources to meet
 
human needs; the vivid inequalities among nations of the
 
world and among the people of the same nation; the high
 
degree of interdependence among nations of the globe; the
 
energy crisis; and air pollution have all placed the federal
 
government in a difficult position.
 
With such perplexing and intricate problems, there
 
has been a growing tendency on the part of individuals and
 
business firms to rely on the government and ask for its
 
aid. Both individuals and business firms turn to the
 
government for help; and, ironically, when the government
 
steps in to offer such assistance, the same individuals and
 
business firms complain about over-regulation, loss of
 
individual liberty, and other injustices on the part of the
 
government. The paradox is clear—the demand for public
 
service on the one nand and the aversion of many towards
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govGrniusnt on th© otheir. Nevertheless, the fact remains;
 
the federal government can no longer afford to be a
 
bystander, but rather must be an active participant in
 
solving these problems. As an active participant, the
 
government is not only solving the problems but, in some
 
cases, is taking the initiative and functioning as a change
 
agent. The federal government is thereby bringing about
 
political, economical, and social changes throughout the
 
nation and the world, as well, with the objective of either
 
reducing the adverse effects of the problems or eliminating
 
their causes.
 
Whether the federal government issues a web of laws
 
or regulations, creates new agencies, dismantles others,
 
reorganizes its structure, or conducts certain programs to
 
meet the people's needs and help solve problems, there is
 
always cost attached to- any of its activities. It is quite
 
logical to assume that the more the federal government
 
expands its role, the more the costs of carrying out its
 
activities year after year will increase. This has acti
 
vated the concern of many regarding the efficiency and
 
effectiveness of government performance, in addition to the
 
traditional concern with controlling the government costs.
 
Accounting information on costs and benefits of government
 
activities has not always been available. Measures of
 
efficiency and effectiveness of government programs have
 
always posed problems for scholars and practitioners.
 
Meanwhile, there have been highly sophisticated and
 
successful managerial and accounting methods and designs in
 
the private sector yielding valuable information of substan
 
tial help in decision making and evaluation of performance
 
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. The comparison
 
between the two sectors has led many intellectuals and
 
practitioners to feel the inadequacy of the accounting
 
methods and systems in the federal government, and conse
 
quently, have made these groups concerned with the inadequate
 
quality and the low reliability of the information derived.
 
These groups argue that now is the time for the federal
 
government to change its accounting reports and methods to
 
become more business-like. Specifically, they call for the
 
application of the accrual method of accounting in govern
 
ment. These groups see this as a major step towards having
 
meaningful information on government activities,. They also
 
maintain that accrual accounting can serve as a valuable
 
tool in the decision-making process. Additionally, these
 
groups view the accrual.method of accounting as a must in
 
order to be able to utilize accounting information to its
 
maximum potential.
 
It is in regard to this issue of the accrual method
 
of accounting in the federal government that the thrust of
 
this inquiry was focused.
 
The main objective was to analyze the pros and cons
 
of this issue, unveil the arguments for and against it.
 
and explore its difficulties.
 
The assumptions on which the thesis was predicated
 
are simple and clear:
 
1. The federal government is the largest and most
 
complex organization in the United States. In terms of
 
structure, goals, manpower, or financial resources, there
 
is no other single organization that equals the federal
 
government.
 
2. In viewing the federal government from any
 
angle, politics and political considerations are pivotal
 
and tend to be at the heart of any issue. It is unrealistic
 
to speak of the government strictly on an apolitical
 
basis.
 
3. There are and there always will be differences
 
between the private and public organizations in several
 
respects. For example, the basic goal of private organi
 
zations is profit through the sale of goods and services;
 
but public organizations have political and moral goals to
 
achieve. Furthermore, the goal of the private organizations
 
can be easily determined and measured. Public organizations'
 
goals in regard to responsiveness to social needs are
 
volatile and difficult to measure. The market place tends
 
to impact the decision-making process in private organi
 
zations while national and international politics tend to
 
impact the decision-making process in public organizations.
 
4. Systems and methods cannot be evaluated on their
 
own merits. Systems and methods ought to be evaluated
 
within an organizational context. In other words, they
 
should be evaluated in terras of their compatibility and
 
usefulness to organizational goals and environment.
 
The organization of the thesis is as follows:
 
The first chapter is a discussion of the nature of
 
the accounting discipline, the accounting methods, and
 
accounting as an information system.
 
The second chapter is descriptive in nature and is
 
a survey of the federal budget and accounting systems and
 
methods.
 
Chapters three, four, and five deal with the accrual
 
method in government. The third chapter is a historical
 
account of the accrual method of accounting in the federal
 
government. The fourth chapter is an analysis and a dis
 
cussion of the problems in adopting the accrual method of
 
accounting. The fifth chapter is an analysis of the pros
 
and cons regarding the application of the accrual method in
 
the federal government.
 
The last chapter summarizes and provides for some
 
conclusions on the issue.
 
It is also important to mention that discussion and
 
analysis were limited to the activities of the federal gov
 
ernment, which are accounted for in the general fund. Other
 
activities accounted for in separate funds were excluded.
 
Specifically, intragovernmental service, enterprise, and
 
trust funds were not included. The reasons for this were,
 
firstly, that the first two types of funds are designed to
 
account for certain activities on a commercial basis and
 
are operated on a business-like orientation. The truth is
 
that they do not raise any technical, not to say political,
 
problems concerning the accrual method of accounting.
 
Secondly, trust funds are established to account for
 
certain revenues which are earmarked for specific govern
 
mental programs. Social Security and Highway trust funds
 
are examples of these types of funds. Receipts and expendi
 
tures from these trust funds are probably the least
 
controllable as compared with other funds. Administration
 
of such funds is a question that goes beyond accrual account
 
ing. Also, within trust funds there may exist "trust­
revolving funds" which account for business-type operations
 
and, as such, should not raise technical problems regarding
 
the accrual method of accounting.
 
Thirdly, general fund activities account for a sub
 
stantial portion of the federal budget in terms of both
 
receipts and outlays (see Appendix A).
 
Fourthly, the nature of the general fund activities
 
poses certain problems regarding their susceptibility to the
 
accrual method.
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the terms "public
 
organizations," "government," and "federal government" were
 
used interchangeably to mean, unless otherwise stated, the
 
executive branch of government (i.e., the federal agencies)
 
Throughout the paper it was necessary to make com
 
parisons between the private and the public organizations
 
whenever it seemed appropriate and relevant.
 
CHAPTER I
 
ACCOUNTING AS AN INFORMATION SYSTEM
 
Professor A. C. Pigou wrote:
 
When a man sets out upon any course of inquiry,
 
the object of his search may be either light or
 
fruit-bearing, either knowledge for its own sake
 
or knowledge for the sake of good things to which
 
it leads. In various fields of study these two .
 
ideals play parts of varying importance. In the
 
appeal made to our interest by nearly all the
 
great modern sciences some stress is laid both upon
 
the light-bearing and upon the fruit-bearing quality,
 
but the proportions of the blend are different in
 
different sciences.^
 
While Professor Pigou maintained this bright dis
 
tinction among various sciences on the basis of the object
 
of man's search, there are other distinctions that can be
 
drawn and which were also recognized explicitly or implicitly
 
by Professor Pigou. One of these other distinctions is that
 
which is based on the subject matter. According to this dis
 
tinction and quoting Spencer:
 
A science is a branch of study concerned with
 
establishing and systematizing facts, principles,
 
and methods. The social sciences are those branches
 
of study dealing in a scientific way with human
 
beings in their many relationships with one another.
 
They are to be contrasted with the natural sciences,
 
such as physics, biology, and astronomy, which study
 
the structures and processes of organisms and other
 
^A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed.
 
(London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1932), p. 3.
 
physical phenomena. There are a number of differ
 
ent social sciences, but they all overlap to some
 
extent. Any boundary between them is very hazy,
 
for scholars are free to study whatever interests
 
them.^
 
History, economics, political science, management, and psy
 
chology generally fall under social sciences. Chemistry,
 
physics and biology come rightfully under natural sciences.
 
There is, more or less, a common agreement among
 
several writers that scientific inquiry in natural sciences
 
is far more amenable to experimentation, quantification,
 
preciseness, and universality than in social sciences. Such
 
laws as Newton's law of gravitation and Boyle's law of the
 
inverse relationship between the gas volume and pressure are
 
quantitative and generic. In social sciences, it is quite
 
difficult to attain such a status. First, man himself is a
 
complex creature. Second, the complexity, multiplicity and
 
interdependence of variables in the social arena cloud any
 
conclusion about cause-effect relationships. Third, experi
 
ments are rejected occasionally on religious, ethical, or
 
legal grounds; and when conducted, the results are cautiously
 
concluded and may apply only to a specific situation.
 
Finally, there is room for bias which, no matter how con
 
trolled, has an impact on the results obtained.
 
When we speak of natural science laws with a sense
 
of certainty, we can speak of social science laws only with
 
^Metta Spencer, Foundation of Modern Sociology
 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976),
 
p. 2.
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a degree of confidence. For example, we can say that money
 
may motivate people at work. The word "may" is used because
 
we are not certain whether money is always going to motivate
 
people or not, and because there are other variables that
 
come into play and which should be considered. Regarding
 
social science results, Simon maintained that "the results
 
are statistical, rather than of an all-or-nothing kind;. . .
 
the results of a social-science study seldom are so clear­
cut."^
 
In spite of these difficulties, social scientists
 
have achieved remarkable progress in their fields of economics,
 
politics, behavior, etc. Their mission in developing a
 
systematic body of knowledge is more difficult than that of
 
natural scientists, yet their achievements cannot be down
 
played. In addition to their attempts to adhere to the steps
 
of scientific inquiry, they have also devised their own
 
methods which are valid and reliable; hence, they are scien­
4
 
tific. The historical method, the case method, the
 
comparative and cross-cultural methods, and the inter
 
disciplinary method reflect the endeavors, talents, and
 
^Julian L. Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social
 
Science: The Art of Empirical Investigation (New York:
 
Random House, 1969), p. 474.
 
^The traditional components of the scientific method
 
comprise observation, collection and classification of data,
 
formulation of hypothesis, testing and verification, and
 
finally generalization. In natural sciences such generali
 
zations tend to be in the form of quantitative laws.
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innovations of social scientists in a complex and changing
 
world.
 
The question now is where does accounting fit in
 
this discussion? The various definitions offered to account
 
ing concentrate on the concern of the accounting discipline
 
with the measurement of human economic activities, recording,
 
summarizing, analyzing, and communicating pertinent informa
 
tion to interested parties. It can be concluded that
 
accounting is a light-bearing and a fruit-bearing course of
 
inquiry on the one hand, and that it falls under the category
 
of social sciences on the other.
 
The reason for this categorization is, firstly,
 
accounting information throws light on the results of opera
 
tions of an organization and its financial position; and,
 
therefore, this information is valuable in itself and sought
 
for its own sake.
 
Secondly, there is the promise that sucn information
 
will lead to good things (i.e., sound economic decisions in
 
the areas of planning, control, and evaluation). Such
 
decisions are the fruits of accounting information.
 
Finally, since accounting information is an identi
 
fication and a measurement of economic human activities,
 
generally within an organizational context, accounting
 
rightfully comes under the social sciences category.
 
In the course of its evolution from its primitive
 
form to its present sophisticated form, accounting has
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always been a valuable source of information. Further,
 
several subfields have emerged as a response to the com
 
plexity, diversification, and specialization of human social
 
and economic organizations. Not only do we have financial
 
accounting but we also have cost accounting, managerial
 
accounting, tax accounting, non-profit organization
 
accounting, government accounting, and auditing. Recently,
 
two more subfields have emerged: social accounting and inter
 
national accounting.
 
The basic theme in all these subfields is the finan
 
cial and economic information measured in monetary terms.
 
No wonder accounting stands at the heart of any quantitative
 
information system within an organization, be it private or
 
public.
 
This information is used by managers and adminis
 
trators for decision making within the organization. Owners
 
and other outside groups interested in the organization rely
 
on the information to make such decisions that best suit them.
 
As Professor Horngren stated:
 
The accounting system is the major quantitative
 
information system in almost every organization. It
 
should provide information for three broad purposes:
 
1. Internal reporting to managers, for use in
 
planning and controlling routine operations.
 
2. Internal reporting to managers for use in
 
making non-routine decisions and in formulating
 
major plans and policies.
 
3. External reporting to stock-holders, govern
 
ment and other outside parties.
 
^Charles T. Horngren, Cost Accounting, A Managerial
 
Emphasis, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-

Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 3-4.
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The accounting information is also vital at the
 
federal level. According to the United States General
 
Accounting Office:
 
Accounting in the federal government should serve
 
two broad purposes.
 
First, it should provide data useful to agency
 
management officials in carrying out their responsi
 
bilities efficiently and economically.
 
Second, it should provide information that can
 
be reported to the Congress, the President, the
 
central financial agencies and the public on the
 
sources and uses of the financial resources made
 
available to the federal agencies.
 
On the basis of historical costs and the statements
 
reflecting the results of operations,managers are able to
 
plan and budget for future operations. The budget, pre
 
sumably a plan expressed in financial terms, is also a means
 
to control the activities and direct them towards achieving
 
the organizational goals. This control function of the
 
budget is made possible through the periodic evaluation of
 
performance and comparison of the actual results (i.e.,
 
expenses and revenues with standards such as budgeted amounts
 
of expenses and revenues). When tnere is a variance, managers
 
become aware that there is a problem and that a decision has
 
to be made. The problem may be in the standard itself. For
 
example, it may be too high or too low and, therefore, it
 
needs to be revised. The problem, however, may be in the
 
actual performance of the employees; and, again, a decision
 
^U.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
 
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government
 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), jT! TT
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has to be made in this regard. The decision may be to
 
motivate the employees toward a better performance and,
 
subsequently, to achieve organizational goals.
 
Davidson and Trueblood maintained that:
 
The tie between the accounting process and the
 
decision making process . . . is basically one of
 
information. In its broadest and most fruitful
 
sense, accounting is an information or data-

providing function;. . . one of the uses of a
 
favorable or unfavorable variance generated by a
 
standard cost system is simply to tell management
 
that it has a problem. . . . The standard cost
 
system is an information device to indicate when
 
there is a problem.
 
Gibson, on the same line of argument, maintained
 
that management uses accounting data as a means of recog
 
nizing the need for a decision and for comparing alternative
 
courses of action. The financial analysis on the impact of
 
each alternative is the means by which accounting information
 
can aid management in selecting the best possible one.
 
Pricing the inventory and selecting the depreciation method
 
are but examples of alternative courses of action made
 
available to management.8
 
The truth is that accounting has been shifting from
 
its "throwing-light" role exemplified in the historical
 
orientation with emphasis on past events, towards a "fruit­
bearing" role demonstrated in a future orientation where this
 
'^J. Justin Davidson and Robert M. Trueblood, "Account­in^ for Decision Making," Accounting Review 36 (October 1961)
 
°James L. Gibson, "Accounting in the Decision Making
 
Process: Some Empirical Evidence," Accounting Review 38
 
(July 1963):492-500.
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information is used in aiding the decision-making process
 
which, by its very nature, is future oriented.
 
Naturally, there has to be an accounting system
 
within the frame of which data are input, processed and out­
putted in the form of meaningful, intelligible information.
 
This includes the existence of records, documents, books,
 
procedures, and methods for recording, summarizing and
 
classifying the data and producing the financial reports.
 
An accounting system has to have some basic characteristics.
 
First, it has to be capable of producing the information that
 
is required by management on a routine basis for routine
 
decision making and it has to be flexible enough to produce
 
information for non-routine decisions. Secondly, the informa
 
tion has to be timely. Late information is similar to no
 
information at all because there is little value in it.
 
Thirdly, the system has to convey an element of internal
 
control and be economic. Finally, the system has to be
 
relevant to the organizational goals, compatible with
 
employees' abilities to implement it and integrated as a
 
component of a management information system.
 
An important point related to the accounting system
 
is the method of recording the transactions. The signifi
 
cance of the accounting method of recording stems from the
 
fact that each method tends to yield a different result. In
 
other words, each method has a different scope of information,
 
Basically, there are four methods. They are as follows:
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1. The aoarual method, whereby revenues and expenses
 
are recorded at the point of realization regardless of
 
whether cash is received or expended. This method is widely
 
used by private sector organizations as it helps them achieve
 
their objective of determining profits, and matching revenues
 
and expenses.
 
2. The cash method, whereby revenues and expenses
 
are recorded when cash is received or expended, respectively,
 
and not at the point of realization. This method does not
 
reflect the true revenues or expenses for an accounting
 
period, nor does it match revenues with expenses. This
 
method is generally used by nonprofit organizations and
 
several governmental units.
 
3. The modified accrual method, whereby revenues
 
are recorded v/hen cash is received, except for material and/
 
or available revenue that should be recorded when taxes are
 
levied. Expenditures (other than accrued interest on gen
 
eral long-term debt) are recorded at the time liabilities
 
are incurred regardless of whether cash is expended. This
 
method is also used by several governmental entities at
 
the State and local levels and other nonprofit organizations.
 
4. The obligations method, whereby federal agencies
 
are required to record the amounts of orders placed on con
 
tracts awarded and which will require payment when these
 
orders and contracts are fulfilled. When these amounts are
 
recorded, they represent obligations against the spending
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authority of an agency. This method establishes a strong
 
point of control because federal agencies are required not
 
to spend more than what has been authorized by Congress.
 
Thus, this method, in essence, is a tracking system of how
 
much spending authority is available to spend, how much is
 
used (obligated), and how much is left. At this point, the
 
obligations incurred method in the federal agencies is
 
similar to the encumbrance method as used in the State and
 
local governments. Both methods have a part or all of the
 
spending authority being committed or obligated.
 
However, the Office of Management and Budget has
 
always expanded the meaning of obligations incurred to mean
 
not only commitment, but also to encompass liabilities. In
 
Section 22.1 of Circular A-34, "services received" are
 
included as obligations incurred; and in Section 25.1,
 
"amounts earned by employees and others during the reporting
 
period" are also included. This tends to confuse the concept
 
of obligations incurred, with the concept of accrued expendi
 
tures. The latter is defined in the same circular under
 
Section 21.1 to mean "charges to an account during a given
 
period that reflect liabilities incurred and the need to pay
 
for services performed by employees, contractors . . . goods
 
9
 
and other tangible property received."
 
Organizations are different in terms of goals, size.
 
9
 
U.S., Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-34
 
(VJashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975),
 
pp. 5-17.
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structure, environment, and management orientation. It
 
follows that management's need for information varies from
 
one organization to another. For example, a nonprofit or a
 
charitable organization is interested in providing its ser
 
vices within the limits of its revenues to those who qualify
 
for such services. With the inflexibility of producing its
 
revenues and significance of controlling expenditures, it
 
may be control oriented. The cash basis, as a method of
 
accounting, could very well be its best method. A profit-

oriented organization, on the other hand, is interested in
 
the matching and measuring of revenues and expenses to
 
determine profitability. This is because of the heavy impli
 
cations that a profit or loss may have on management decisions
 
An accrual method of accounting and cost accounting informa
 
tion are important in such a situation.
 
In short, an accounting system designed and an
 
accounting method selected are expected to differ from one
 
organization to another. There is no "bad" system or a
 
"good" system; nor should there be a bad, good, or superior
 
method of accounting. But the criteria for badness, good
 
ness, or "superiority" are relative questions that differ
 
as they are applied within an organizational context. The
 
goals, the type, the size, and management orientation con
 
trol to a large degree the nature of information required
 
and, accordingly, the accounting system and the accounting
 
method to be applied. In short, there is no one single
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system or method of accounting that can be viewed as a
 
panacea applicable to all organizations.
 
Thus far it has been demonstrated that accounting
 
information is both a light-throwing and a fruit-bearing
 
type of information and that accounting as a discipline may
 
be categorized as a social science. An accounting system
 
and the accounting method selected are the means of receiv
 
ing, processing, and producing the information. Both the
 
accounting system and the accounting method are expected to
 
vary because organizations are different in several respects.
 
Before concluding this chapter, reference should be
 
made to two important points:
 
Firstly, man is involved in all stages of the account
 
ing system. It is man who designs the system, records and
 
summarizes the transactions, produces the reports and
 
analyzes them, communicates the information, and finally
 
makes the decisions. Therefore, we cannot downplay the
 
relationship between accounting on the one hand and human
 
behavior on the other. The relation between budgeting and
 
accounting and the human element will be referred to in the
 
subsequent chapters. On this subject, Professor Hendriksen
 
stated:
 
A more recent emphasis in the development of
 
accounting theories has been the acceptance of a
 
communication-decision orientation. The focus is
 
on the relevance of information being communicated
 
to decision makers and the behavior of different
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individuals or groups as a result of the presen
 
tation of accounting information.^^
 
Secondly, speaking of accounting as an information
 
system, we have to acknowledge that it is but one component
 
of a management information system which contributes sub
 
stantially to the decision-making process. Statistical
 
information, for example, on the number of employees or on
 
the number of minorities within an organization is relevant
 
information which is not provided through accounting records.
 
In the case of the government, the overall political atti
 
tude of the people and their preferences are also significant
 
information for the decision-making process; but this
 
information cannot be extracted from accounting records or
 
financial statements. Also, complete information is still
 
a remote goal because of the complexity and rapid change of
 
pace in all aspects of life.
 
The point is that accounting is an information
 
system and is not the information system.
 
^^Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory, 3rd ed. ^
 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), p. 5.
 
CHAPTER II
 
THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING
 
Perhaps the most important annual document in the
 
United States is the budget of the federal government. The
 
significance of the budget emanates from the political,
 
economical, social, and administrative characteristics
 
embodied in the budget process.
 
Political Characteristics of the Budget
 
Politically, the budget is a reflection of the
 
philosophy of the politicians in power, their identification
 
of national problems and their approach to solving them,
 
their determination of national priorities, and their general
 
policies. The budget process, from its formulation to its
 
implementation, brings virtually all political actors on the
 
scene. There are the agencies that prepare their budget
 
estimates and advocate their budget requests. For them
 
their share of the pie is a sign of power and a recognition
 
from higher political authorities of their roles and goals.
 
The Office of Management and Budget (0MB) issues guidelines
 
to the agencies, filters their requests, and functions as
 
liaison between them and the President. In this capacity
 
the 0MB is a powerful entity of which agencies are, or should
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be, aware. The President as the head of the executive
 
branch transmits his basic goals and philosophy to the 0MB,
 
reviews, revises, and finally approves recommendations. The
 
President transmits his administration's budget to Congress.
 
After receiving the President's budget, and before
 
acting on appropriations or specific measures, the budget
 
committees have to adopt the first concurrent resolution.
 
This has to be reported by April 15 so that it may be
 
adopted no later than May 15. This first concurrent resolu
 
tion is viewed as a tentative budget where target totals
 
are set for budget authority, receipts, and outlays.
 
According to Professor Finley, ". . . the first concurrent
 
resolution can be expected to deal with macro economic
 
matters and broad functional allocations."^
 
The second resolution is reported after the indi
 
vidual appropriation bills are acted upon, and it has to be
 
reported by September 15. The second resolution will either
 
alter the first resolution targets or will affirm it.
 
This resolution which is in effect the final
 
congressional budget or ceiling, must specify to
 
the appropriate committees the amounts, if any,
 
by which changes must be made in budget authority,
 
outlays and revenue and debt limits. By September
 
25 these committees are to report through the
 
Budget Committees a reconciliation bill to affect
 
any changes necessary to conform to the second
 
resolution. Congress is not to adjourn until it
 
has approved this reconciliation legislation.^
 
^James J. Finley, "The 1974 Congressional Initiative
 
in Budget Making," Public Administration Review (May/June
 
1975):270-78.
 
^Ibid., p. 272.
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support, Rourke maintained that:
 
A vital source of power for administrative agencies
 
is their ability to attract the support of outside
 
groups. . . . There are three vital centers from
 
which political support may be drawn: the outside
 
community, the legislature, and the executive branch
 
itself. . . . When an agency does have strong
 
external support, it may use this constituency as a
 
device for bringing pressure to bear upon lawmakers
 
to reverse legislative decisions on appropriations
 
that it considers disadvantageous. . . . An
 
agency's success in fending off budget cuts in
 
the House is a measure of its good rapport with
 
legislators;. . . good relations with the Office of
 
Management and Budget are an invaluable asset for any
 
executive agency.
 
The Office of Management and Budget which super
 
seded the Bureau of Budget pursuant to Reorganization Plan
 
No. 2 of 1970 has certain political, fiscal, and adminis
 
trative powers which cannot be ignored by the agencies. To
 
begin with, the 0MB is the President's principal arm for the
 
exercise of his managerial functions. It advises the Presi
 
dent on matters related to the budget, both in the preparation
 
phase and the implementation phase. It is also responsible
 
for improvement of government organization, information, and
 
management systems.
 
Wildavsky maintained that every agency and its
 
officials must decide what kind of relationship to maintain
 
with the Budget Bureau (currently the 0MB). He provided
 
three reasons why an agency would push information at the
 
examiners of the 0MB:
 
^Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public
 
Policy, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976),
 
pp. 42-67.
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1. It helps the examiners to be competent
 
defenders of the agency's viewpoint.
 
2. They may become advocates of certain
 
programs.
 
3. To secure administration assistance in
 
clearing up some difficulty.'^
 
Rourke stated that ". . . good relations with the Office of
 
Management and Budget are an invaluable asset for any execu­
..5
 
tive agency.
 
Presidents are also different in their views on pub
 
lic policy issues and in their tactics for approaching them.
 
The budget for fiscal year 1978 is a good example of how
 
two consecutive presidents differed in this respect. Pechman
 
stated:
 
The budget for the fiscal year beginning
 
October 1, 1977, and ending September 30, 1978,
 
which was formulated by President Ford and
 
revised by President Carter, contains an amalgam
 
of programs reflecting their very different budget
 
philosophies.^
 
Pechman provided an outstanding analysis of how the
 
views and philosophies of both presidents. Ford and Carter,
 
were different in areas such as Defense, Employment and
 
Training, and Social Security, to mention a few. In the
 
Defense area, the Carter budget, as compared to the Ford
 
program, placed less emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons
 
and more emphasis on the readiness of military units for
 
^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary
 
Process, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, Inc.,
 
1974), p. 39.
 
^Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy, p.67.
 
^Joseph A. Pechman, Ed., Setting National Priorities:
 
The 1978 Budget (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
 
1977), p. 1.
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combat. President Carter's amendment to former President
 
Ford's budget included a reduction of $2.8 billion. In the
 
area of Employment and Training, President Ford recommended
 
that the temporary public service employment program be
 
phased out in 1978 and expenditures under the Comprehensive
 
Employment and Training Act be reduced to approximately the
 
level that prevailed before the recent recession.
 
Ford also opposed the use of public works and
 
employment tax credits to combat unemployment. In contrast,
 
President Carter requested an increase in budget authority
 
of about $10 billion for employment and training assistance
 
and $4 billion for public works over fiscal years 1977 and
 
1978. In the area of Social Security, President Ford recom
 
mended increases in the payroll tax rate to restore the
 
necessary balances in the trust fund. President Carter has
 
proposed that the revenue shortfall attributable to the
 
recession be made up by transfers from general revenues to
 
the trust funds. For the future, he proposed to eliminate
 
the ceiling on the taxable wage base for the employer's
 
portion of the payroll tax and raise the ceiling for the
 
employees portion by $2,400 in four installments from 1979
 
to 1985.^
 
At the congressional level, members are also torn
 
between the two political extremes: their desire to control
 
^Ibid., pp. 7-22.
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and reduce public expenditure and their desire to respond
 
to their constituencies by providing services and maintaining
 
certain programs which eventually bring about expenditures.
 
Sometimes a sense of identification with a particular agency
 
may be created because its mission is highly valued by some
 
members. Wildavsky eminently illustrated these conflicting
 
political considerations when he said:
 
The desire to cut the budget may conflict with
 
the desire not to damage programs vital to the
 
nation. . . . In the case of local constituency
 
interests, the deviation from guardianship of the
 
budget is exceedingly powerful because it touches
 
on the most basic relationship a Congressman may
 
have--that with the people who elect him and
 
might conceivably defeat him.
 
Taken together, the overall picture tends to reflect
 
the American government's political characteristics of checks
 
and balances and separation of powers. Here we face the
 
interplay between the Executive Branch and the Legislative
 
Branch. It has always been the objective of Congress to
 
maintain control over the financial affairs of the govern
 
ment. It is Congress who has the constitutional power to
 
lay and collect taxes, to borrow money on the credit of the
 
United State, and to coin money. Congress, as the guardian
 
of the public purse, has enacted several laws to maintain
 
and enhance its powers to offset that of the executive branch,
 
The establishment of the General Accounting Office, in
 
accordance with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, with
 
Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 49.
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responsibility only to Congress, is an example of congres
 
sional intent. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act
 
of 1974 has added substantially to the powers of Congress
 
in dealing with two major problems that have for long
 
frustrated the members of Congress: (1) backdoor spending,
 
to a lesser extent, which is the approval of budget authority
 
by routes other than the regular appropriations process; and
 
(2) the power of presidents to impound funds appropriated by
 
Congress. While backdoor spending has been compromised
 
rather than resolved, the presidential power of impoundment
 
has been offset by congressional power to overrule presi­
9
 
dential impoundment and to force the release of funds.
 
Budget cuts, authorization, and provision of funds through
 
appropriations are all typical examples of congressional
 
control.
 
If we accept the premise that a federal agency's
 
share of the budget represents the revenues allocated to it
 
for a fiscal year, we easily can recognize a sharp differ
 
ence between the process of producing revenue in a public
 
organization as compared with a private (business) organiza
 
tion. Readily observable is the fact that management in
 
public organizations is deeply involved in politics, is
 
subject to more external political forces, and is not the
 
sole power in determining how much to spend, on what, and
 
9
 
See for example Michael E. Levy, The Federal Budget:
 
Its Impact on the Economy (New York: The Conference Board,
 
Inc., 1976), pp. 27-34.
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how much revenue to expect. In private organizations, to
 
the contrary, there are not too many actors who shape their
 
budgets. External forces are those of the market place
 
(i.e., they are economic rather than political; and manage
 
ment, generally, has the power to decide how much to spend,
 
on what, and how much revenue to expect by selling its
 
services or commodities in the market place). In short,
 
economic behavior and motivation in private organizations
 
provide for their revenues while political behavior and
 
motivation determine, to a large degree, public organiza
 
tions' revenues.
 
Economical Characteristics of the Budget
 
Economically speaking, the federal budget is viewed
 
as an economic document which serves the basic economic
 
functions of government within an economy of scarce
 
resources and competing goals.
 
Following Musgrave's line of thought on public
 
budgeting, Gardner envisioned three general responsibilities
 
of government: (1) the stabilization function, which relates
 
to the maintenance of high levels of resource utilization
 
and stable price levels; (2) the distribution function,
 
which alters the distribution of income resulting from the
 
market process; and (3) the allocation function., which deals
 
with the satisfaction of the wants of the members of society
 
Wayland D. Gardner, Government Finance, National,
 
State and Local (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-

Hall, Inc., 1978), pp. 3-13.
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Here, again, differences can be recognized between
 
public budgeting as compared to private budgeting. The
 
motivation behind public budgeting is to achieve broad
 
national goals. Private sector budgeting is, to a large
 
degree, parochial and self-interested (i.e., profit is a
 
basic motivation). Profit is measurable and serves as a
 
ready standard for evaluating previous decisions. Govern
 
mental decision making, in general, lacks this standard for
 
measuring its activities. Government output, usually
 
intangible and immeasurable, is consumed by the nation as a
 
whole. Economically, it is collectively consumed and is not
 
divisible among individuals. Another distinct feature of
 
government output is that there is no price tag for each
 
service provided for each individual.
 
Social Characteristics of the Budget
 
From a social standpoint, the public is interested in
 
the budget document in two respects. Firstly, how much taxes
 
they will be paying is the public's first or basic question.
 
Realistically, this is the major concern and the basic tie
 
between the average citizen and the budget. Secondly, the
 
public questions whether government expenditure is really
 
helping them solve their problems. The answer to this second
 
question is difficult and differs from one citizen to the
 
Robert D. Lee, Jr., and Ronald W. Johnson, Public
 
Budgeting Systems (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1975),
 
p. 2.
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next because it deals with evaluating the "intangible" and
 
because judgment is usually a matter of individual perception.
 
The budget can also be seen as the mechanism, by virtue of
 
which, the government fulfills its moral obligations and
 
its social responsibility towards its citizens. This is
 
accomplished through certain programs administered by the
 
Health, Education and Welfare Agency, the Housing and Urban
 
Development Agency, and the Veterans Administration, to
 
mention a few. For the private sector, these notions of
 
moral obligations and social responsibility are still con
 
troversial and vague issues which cannot, and will not,
 
override the profit motivation.
 
Administrative Characteristics of the Budget
 
From an administrative point of view, the federal
 
budget has been, in many cases, the starting point of any
 
attempt to improve government operations. The budget reform
 
has always been viewed as a vehicle to bring about efficiency
 
and effectiveness in carrying out government activities.
 
Additionally, because the budget is a political document,
 
reforms in the budget are simultaneous with the prevailing
 
political climate.
 
In his article "The Road to PPB: The Stages of
 
Budget Reform," Allen Schick succinctly has correlated both
 
the reform stages and the political climate. According to
 
Schick, the budget was control-oriented when government was
 
viewed as a necessary evil and there was little recognition
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of the social value of public expenditures. During that
 
time, the main function of the budget was to keep spending
 
in check. However, as the work and accomplishments of
 
government came to be regarded and valued, coupled with
 
statutes to curb administrative abuses and the development
 
of management sciences, the budget has become management
 
oriented. This management orientation focused on problems
 
of managing large programs and organizations. Concepts of
 
efficiency, effectiveness, and performance and program
 
budget came to be known. The third stage, which is planning
 
oriented, came after certain developments in the areas of
 
economic analysis and informational and decisional tech
 
nologies. The past two decades have witnessed the permea
 
tion of many techniques into the budget process with the
 
intent of reforming the budget and increasing the efficiency
 
12
 
and effectiveness of government operations.
 
Planning Programming and Budgeting, systems analysis,
 
cost-benefit analysis. Management by Objectives, and Zero-

Base Budgeting are all examples of attempts to improve the
 
budget. To the extent that any one or more of these tech
 
niques receive the "political blessing" of political actors
 
of the budget will decide whether these techniques will achieve
 
the expected results. In the private sector organizations,
 
the budget is also an administrative tool for planning and
 
^^Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of
 
Budget Reform," Public Administration Review 26 (December
 
1966):243-59.
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control. The primary objective, however, is to maximize
 
profits. Innovations in budgeting techniques are stimulated
 
by competition, technology, and other conditions in the
 
market place.
 
In summary, the federal budget is a political,
 
economical, social, and administrative document. The budget
 
is a plan as well as a means of management and control.
 
Political considerations are of primary significance because
 
several political actors come into play in making decisions
 
about the budget. The top management of a federal agency
 
is not the only decision maker in determining the agency's
 
fiscal resources. The revenue of a federal agency depends
 
to a large degree on its mission in relation to national
 
priorities, the political philosophy of politicians, and
 
the political support that its management can mobilize. The
 
output of government operations is mostly intangible with no
 
price tag on each type of service. Consumption of output is
 
collective and shared among all individuals. There is no
 
profit motive behind government budget or operations. These
 
characteristics and their implications on the decision-

making process represent the basic points of departure
 
between the public and private budgeting since the reverse
 
is usually held true for private sector organizations.
 
The Federal Accounting System
 
The basic philosophy behind the federal accounting
 
system can be found in the words of Alexander Hamilton, who
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was the first Secretary of Treasury:
 
The design of the constitution in this provision
 
(Section 9, Clause 7) was, as I conceive, to secure
 
these important ends--that the purpose, the limit,
 
and the fund of every expenditure should be ascer
 
tained by a previous law. The public security is
 
complete in this particular, if no money can be
 
expended, but for an object, to an extent, and
 
out of a fund, which the laws have prescribed.
 
This basic philosophy has been maintained, enhanced,
 
and developed over the years. As seen now, the basic account
 
ing principles and standards in the federal agencies include,
 
but are not limited to, the following.
 
Legal Compliance Principle
 
According to this principle, accounting systems and
 
reports should ensure that all financial transactions have
 
been executed in accordance with the laws and regulations
 
and that the legal provisions or requirements have been met.
 
Additionally, legal provisions have precedence over generally
 
accepted accounting principles whenever a conflict should
 
arise between the two.
 
Fund Accounting Principle
 
The accounting systems are organized and operated
 
on a fund basis, according to this principle. A fund is:
 
an independent fiscal and accounting entity with a
 
self-balancing set of accounts recording cash and/
 
or other resources together with all related
 
13W. F. Powell, "Control of Federal Expenditures—A
 
Documentary History," quoted in U.S., Congress, Senate,
 
Financial Management in the Federal Government, S. Doc. 11,
 
87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961.
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liabilities, obligations, revenues and equities
 
which are segregated for the purpose of carrying
 
on specific activities or attaining certain objec
 
tives in accordance with special regulations,
 
restrictions or limitations.^'^
 
According to the Comptroller General of the United
 
States, the fund accounts of the federal government are of
 
two general types:
 
1. Funds derived from general taxing and revenue
 
powers and from business operations.
 
2. Funds held by the government in the capacity of
 
15
 
custodian or trustee.
 
The first type of funds is broken into:
 
a. General fund accounts, which account for
 
collections not dedicated to specific purposes. It accounts
 
also for expenditure arising under congressional appropria
 
tions or authorizations to spend general revenues.
 
b. Special fund accounts, which account for
 
separate receipts that are earmarked for specific purposes.
 
c. Revolving fund accounts, which exist by law
 
to finance a continuing cycle of operations. Receipts are
 
generated mostly from outside of the government. Revolving
 
fund accounts may be called public enterprise funds.
 
^^Municipal Finance Officers Association of the
 
United States and Canada, Governmental Accounting, Auditing,
 
and Financial Reporting (Chicago: Cushing-Malloy, Inc.,
 
1974), pp. 6-7.
 
^^U.S., Comptroller General, Accounting Principles
 
and Standards for Federal Agencies (Washington, D.C.:
 
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 2.
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d. Management fund accounts which account for
 
intragovernmental operations which are conducted by an agency
 
to provide services to other agencies on a business-like
 
basis.
 
The second type of funds may be broken into:
 
a. Trust fund accounts, which account for
 
receipts held in trust and which, according to an agreement
 
or a statute, are expended for specific purposes or programs.
 
When it is dedicated to business-type operations, it is
 
called a trust-revolving fund.
 
b. Deposit fund accounts, which account for
 
receipts held in suspense temporarily and later refunded or
 
paid into some other fund of the government or held by the
 
government as banker or agent for others and paid out at
 
the direction of the owner. Such funds are not available
 
16
 
for paying other expenditures of government or salaries.
 
Fund control means management control over the use
 
of fund authorizations to insure that:
 
1. Funds are used only for authorized purposes.
 
2. They are economically and efficiently used.
 
3. Obligations and expenditures do not exceed
 
the amounts authorized.
 
4. The obligation or expenditure of amounts author
 
ized is not reserved or otherwise deferred without
 
^^Ibid., pp. 2-21.
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congressional knowledge and approval.
 
Each agency is required to have a system of adminis
 
trative control, approved by the Director of the Office of
 
Management and Budget, which will restrict obligations or
 
17
 
expenditures to the amounts appropriated,
 
Basic Structure of Accounts
 
The basic structure of accounts for agency opera
 
tions is as follows:
 
1. Accounts for assets.
 
2. Accounts for liabilities.
 
3. Accounts for investment of the United States
 
government.
 
4. Accounts for investment of others (if applicable).
 
5. Accounts for revenues and costs.
 
These accounts should be adapted to each agency's
 
fund structure to provide an adequate accounting for all
 
resources, liabilities and obligations, expenditures,
 
revenues, and costs.
 
Management and Congressional Needs
 
The accounting system must provide not only a basis
 
for control over funds, property, and other assets but should
 
also provide an accurate and reliable basis for developing
 
and reporting costs of performance by:
 
^"^Ibid., pp. 16-17.
 
l^Ibid., p. 22.
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1. Major organizational segments.
 
2. Budget activities.
 
3. Program structure.
 
The accounting system must be capable of producing
 
financial information needed to keep Congress fully informed
 
of the financial status and operations of the agency.
 
Basis of Accounting
 
The maintenance of accounts on the accrual basis is
 
20
 
a basic requirement for federal agencies.
 
These are some of the basic principles and standards
 
as prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States.
 
One of these principles, the accrual basis of
 
accounting, will be the subject of more discussion and
 
analysis in this paper, beginning first with the history of
 
the accrual concept in the federal government.
 
Before concluding this chapter, it is important to
 
mention that the financial management in the federal govern
 
ment is a joint responsibility of both the legislative and
 
executive branches of government.
 
On the legislative side, the General Accounting Office,
 
created pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, is
 
empowered to audit government's financial operations, pre
 
scribe accounting principles and standards, review and
 
^^Ibid., pp. 9-10.
 
^^Ibid., pp. 2-14. For an illustration of the fiscal
 
cycle in the federal government, see Appendix B.
 
39
 
approve executive agencies' accounting systems, conduct
 
special studies and surveys on behalf of Congress, and
 
assist Congress and its committees in areas of budgeting
 
and accounting. In terms of financial management, the
 
General Accounting Office is the right arm of Congress.
 
On the executive side, more than one actor comes
 
into play. Firstly, the Office of Management and Budget,
 
which superseded the Bureau of the Budget pursuant to
 
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, is considered to be the
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right arm of the President of the United States. This
 
office advises and assists the President on matters related
 
to the budget preparation and execution and the organization
 
and management of the executive branch. It is empowered to
 
approve the apportionment of an agency's appropriated funds
 
before incurring any obligation.
 
Secondly, the Treasury Department is responsible for
 
issuing and processing federal checks, collecting tax
 
revenues, supervising national banks, recommending financial
 
policies, and advising the President on financial matters.
 
It can be viewed as the fiscal agent for the entire govern
 
ment. It is worth mentioning here that the Treasury
 
Department is interested in the cash basis of accounting in
 
order to meet its responsibility in determining whether there
 
is enough cash to cover expenditures or not.
 
^^The Bureau of the Budget was also created pursuant
 
to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. This act is recog
 
nized as a major step forward towards more constructive finan
 
cial management as it created both the General Accounting Office,
 
the Bureau of the Budget, and the national budget system.
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Thirdly, the General Services Administration is
 
responsible for property management, data processing manage
 
ment, vehicles, and contracting management.
 
These three executive agencies issue circulars,
 
guidelines and directives to the various federal agencies,
 
reflecting their areas of concern.
 
Fourthly, the Civil Service Commission is involved
 
in financial management through its responsibilities in the
 
areas of recruitment and training personnel in the fields of
 
accounting, budgeting, and others.
 
In order to coordinate the efforts in the financial
 
management area, the Joint Financial Management Improvement
 
Program began in 1948 as a cooperative effort among the
 
General Accounting Office, the Bureau of the Budget (cur
 
rently the Office of Management and Budget), and the
 
Treasury Department. Later, the Civil Service Commission
 
and then the General Services Administration joined the
 
program. The heads of these five agencies meet periodically
 
to discuss the problems, the plans, and other related
 
matters. The basic objective of this program, which is still
 
in operation, is to improve, modernize, and solve the prob
 
lems in the areas of budgeting and accounting.
 
Finally, the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act
 
of 1950 placed the responsibility of establishing and main
 
taining accounting systems and controls upon the head of
 
each executive agency, subject to approval by the General
 
Accounting Office.
 
CHAPTER III
 
HISTORY OF THE ACCRUAL METHOD
 
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
 
The accrual method of accounting in the federal gov
 
ernment is a major episode in a series called "Improving
 
the Financial Management System in Government." In contrast
 
with other measures taken, legislations enacted, or princi
 
ples adopted in the financial management arena, the accrual
 
method of accounting has been hovering for almost thirty
 
years and has been a subject of controversy.
 
This chapter provides for a historical account of
 
the accrual method in government from the days when it was
 
first recommened in 1949 by the Commission on Organization
 
of the Executive Branch of the Government (popularly known
 
as the first Hoover Commission) to the present.
 
Definition of Terms
 
Since part of the controversy, however, is a matter
 
of terminology, it is quite appropriate to state some defi
 
nitions related to the accrual method of accounting:
 
Accrued Expenditures
 
Accrued expenditures are the charges incurred during
 
a given period requiring the provision of funds for:
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1. Goods and other tangible property received.
 
2. Services performed by employees, contractors,
 
grantees, lessors, and other payees.
 
3. Amounts becoming owed under programs for which
 
no performance or current services are required (such as
 
annuities, insurance claims, other benefit payments, and
 
some cash grants).
 
In essence, then, accrued expenditures are liabili
 
ties which have to be paid.
 
Accrued Costs
 
Accrued costs and/or applied posts represent the
 
costs of resources consumed in the course of producing
 
tangible or intangible output and whether paid for or not.
 
Resources, or factors of production, include labor, materi
 
als, equipment, and overhead.
 
With these two definitions in mind, we turn to the
 
history of the accrual method starting with the first Hoover
 
Commission.
 
History
 
In its February, 1949, report on budgeting and
 
accounting, the Commission on Organization of the Executive
 
Branch of the Government came up with thirteen basic
 
U.S., Comptroller General, Accounting Principles
 
and Standards for Federal Agencies (Washington, D.C.:
 
Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 2-15.
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recommendations covering three areas: (1) The budget,•
 
(2) Office of the Budget; and (3) reorganization of account
 
ing in the government. The eleventh recommendation was
 
followed by "other recommendations." Application of the
 
accrual method was one of these other recommendations:
 
"Our task force on accounting recommends that the accrual
 
basis of accounting should be applied to both revenues and
 
2
 
expendxtures.
 
The task force report prepared for the Commission
 
in January, 1948, recommended that:
 
the accounts be so kept that they will show cur
 
rently, fully, and clearly the sources of the
 
funds provided for the running of the Government
 
and for what purposes these funds are spent;
 
specifically, that the accounts be kept on the
 
accrual basis.^
 
The task force emphasized that an accounting method is next
 
in importance to the establishment of an accounting system,
 
and then specifically demonstrated the significance of the
 
accrual method. The task force viewed the importance of the
 
accrual method to be as follows:
 
1. It affords full current information con
 
cerning the realization of the revenue estimates,
 
expenditures and availability of appropriation.
 
2. It helps control the use and prevent over-

expenditure of appropriations.
 
7U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
 
Branch of the Government, Budgeting and Accounting, Report
 
of . . . (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,
 
T949), p. 43.
 
3
 
John W. Hanes, A. E. Buck, and T. Coleman Andrews,
 
Fiscal, Budgeting and Accounting Systems of Federal Govern
 
ment: A Report with Recommendations Prepared for the
 
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
 
Government (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
 
1949), p. 92.
 
3. It helps maintain positive control of assets,
 
liabilities, estimates of income, appropriations,
 
revenues and expenses.
 
4. It provides a distinction between resources
 
consumed (expenses) and appropriation expenditure.
 
This, in turn, provides for a better accountability
 
of cost on one hand and mere cash disbursements on
 
the other.
 
5. When information is readily available, a
 
lot of time and effort (and consequently costs)
 
are saved for both the Congress and executive
 
agencies that would be wasted in the course of
 
requesting and preparing the information.^
 
The task force has even suggested that the cash basis be
 
completely ruled out.
 
The.case for the accrual method, however, was down
 
played by two factors. First, the task force itself stated
 
that "We cannot too strongly urge the establishment of an
 
appropriate integrated system of accounting kept on the
 
5
 
accrual basis." The task force has not provided any explana
 
tion for such a statement. By alluding to the position of
 
the task force regarding the basic elements of the accounting
 
system, we can easily see that there was a recognition, on
 
its part of the diversity and dispersion of government
 
operations, a subject upon which one central operational
 
accounting system would be impractical. The task force
 
stated that "The number, dissimilarity and geographic dis
 
persion of the government's activities make centralization
 
6
 
of the government's accounting impractxcal." VJhen
 
^Ibid., pp. 102-103
 
^Ibid.., p. 104.
 
^Ibid., p. 100.
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accounting systems are different, we have to expect reasonably
 
that the elements in these systems, including the accounting
 
methods adopted, have to be different. Thus, to recognize
 
different accounting systems, while insisting on one method
 
of accounting, seems somewhat inconsistent.
 
At any rate, the statement that "we cannot too
 
strongly urge the establishment of an appropriate inte
 
grated system of accounting kept on the accrual basis" has
 
not served the task force argument for the ac(prual method
 
Rather, it might have discouraged any serious attempt in this
 
regard.
 
The second factor which contributed to the downplay 
of the case for the accrual method probably was the manner 
in which the Commission itself addressed the recommendation. 
Including the recommendation under "other recornmendations" 
rather than as a separate recommendation reflects that the 
Commission itself did not take it seriously or as a primary 
issue. Readers Of reports usually tend to tai■:e "other 
recommendations" as minor in nature while the separate and 
early recommendations in a report are usually read carefully 
and efforts are directed to implement them. Additionally, 
the CommissionVs wording of the recommendation did not con 
sider the difference between expenditure and cost. 
In 1950 the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act was 
passed and incorporated several recommendations of the 
Hoover Commission. The Act, however, was silent regarding 
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the accrual basis. It did not specify explicitly in any of
 
its provisions that the accrual basis is mandatory. Never
 
theless, the language used in certain provisions of the Act
 
could be interpreted to mean that the accrual;basis should
 
be used. According to Carl Tiller:
 
The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of
 
1950 did not mention the words "accrual" or
 
"accrued" but it implied the accrual basis by
 
the use of other terminology which is used by the
 
professional accountants in relation to adcrual
 
systems."^
 
As an example, the Act uses such phrases as "full disclosure
 
of the results of the financial operations." Yet, the
 
accrual basis "by implication" is not forceful enough to
 
have agencies adopt it as a method of accounting.
 
In 1952, another step,was taken by the Comptroller
 
General of the United States when he issued principles and
 
standards for agency accounting systems statihg that:
 
, . . the accrual basis has long been accepted as
 
the standard in the commercial world and, although
 
much progress has been made in this respect in
 
Federal government accounting, further emphasis on
 
accrual accounting is needed for continued progress
 
in increasing the contribution which accoianting can
 
make to financial management. . . . i
 
In June, 1955, the Hoover Commission in its second
 
round of endeavor came up with two major recommendations in
 
respect to the accrual basis, from a total of twenty-five
 
7Carl W. Tiller, "Why Accrual Accounting?" Defense
 
Management Journal 5 (Summer 1969):29. At that time Mr.
 
Tiller was a special advisor on Budgetary Development for
 
the United States Bureau of the Budget (currently the 0MB).
 
O
 
U.S., General Accounting Office, Accounting Princi
 
ples, Memorandum No. 1, November 26, 1952, quoted in Carl W.
 
Tiller, "Why Accrual Accounting?" Defense Management Journal
 
5 (Summer 1969)':30.
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recoiTUTiendations on budget and accounting. The first of
 
these dealt with the budget and the second dealt with
 
accountingf. ' .
 
Regarding the annual- accrued.expenditure budget:,
 
the Commission recommended that "the^ executive budget and
 
congressional appropriations: be in terms of estimated annual
 
accrued expenditures, namely charges for the cost of goods
 
■ .9 ■ ■ ■ ' ■ " 
and services estimated to be received." This recommendation,
 
aimed at restoration of congressional control of the purse,
 
was probably thought of as an integral part o£ an'overall
 
accrual basis of accounting and budgeting in the goyernment.
 
The reasons behind this recommendation may be stimmarized as
 
follows:
 
1. "Obligations incurred" is a flexible concept
 
which has been interpreted differently by different
 
people. ~There is a tendency in executive agencies
 
to state the obligations incurred at the highest
 
possible figures since this action strengthens the
 
budget requests for the following year. . . .
 
2. The present annual budget is not an effec
 
tive instrument for controlling expenditures as it
 
is not directed to controlling the costs to be
 
incurred in carrying out approved programs. . . .
 
3. The obligation basis of appropriations pro
 
duces an incentive in the agencies to use all
 
available obligational authority prior to the date
 
when it otherwise would lapse for obligating purposes.
 
Such action tends to support agency budget requests
 
for the following fiscal year. . . .
 
9 . , ■ . . 
U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, Budget and Accounting, Report 
of . . . (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,
 
1955), p. 25.
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4. There is no direct and effective ccntrcl
 
ever the. annual budget surplus cr deficit. This is
 
due tc the fact that the appropriations which Con
 
gress enacts each year are intended to control not
 
annual expenditures but the level of obligations
 
which the agencies mav incur, sometimes over
 
several years. . .
 
Regarding the accrual basis of accounting, the
 
Commission recommended that:
 
Government accounts be kept on the accrual basis to
 
show currently, completely and clearly all resources
 
and liabilities, and the costs of operations.
 
Furthermore, agency budgeting and financial report­
ing should be developed from such accrual accounting.
 
The reasons for this recommendation were:
 
This proliferation of allocations,, allotment,
 
and sub-allotments is an attempt to effect manage
 
ment control. The system in itself does not
 
usually provide management with the financial
 
information required for measuring the efficiency
 
and economy with which funds are used.
 
Accounting limited primarily to accounting
 
for obligations and expenditures does not fulfill
 
these requirements.
 
The public and the Congress are entitled to
 
know the real cost of each significant Government
 
undertaking. . . .^^
 
Reference is always made to the second Hoover Com
 
mission whenever the subject of accrual accounting in
 
government is raised. Few, if any at all, would allude to
 
dissents made by three honorable members of the Commission.
 
Commissioner Clarence J. Brown stated:
 
I cannot fully accept Recommendation No. 7 to con
 
vert the congressional appropriations structure
 
to an estimated annual accrued expenditures basis.
 
^°Ibid., pp. 13-20.
 
^^Ibid., p. 38 (Recommendation No. 14).
 
^^Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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This is a radical departure from,a long-standing
 
fiscal policy which would require widespread changes
 
in our entire appropriations process. I am, there
 
fore, unwilling to give it a blanket endorsement
 
without the benefit of further study by appropriate
 
Committees of the Congress.
 
Commissioner James A. Farley stated that:
 
Theoretically these recommendations may be
 
desirable from an accounting point of view; but I
 
am not certain that put into effect they will pro
 
duce the desired objectives.
 
This report has been approached from the view
 
point of a cost accountant operating in a private
 
commercial enterprise, in which goods and services
 
are produced and sold for the avowed purpose of
 
providing a profit to those whose capital is
 
invested. That may be an appropriate concept for
 
certain governmental operations which are similar
 
to private commercial ventures and, in fact, is
 
currently in use by many such governmental organi
 
zations as stated in the report; it does not seem
 
to me, however, to be appropriate across the board
 
to all government activities and operations. Even
 
where cost accounting is used, it does not necessarily
 
provide a measure of the effectiveness of programs
 
which are not primarily related to profit but to the
 
performance of proper governmental functions. The
 
transition to the "cost basis" accounting will
 
require tremendous expense and inconvenience, and
 
there is insufficient evidence that it will be
 
universally workable and wprthwhile.
 
I am hopeful that the appropriate congressional
 
committees to which this report is referred will
 
very carefully examine and explore the possible
 
effects of these recommendations.
 
Finally, Commissioner Chet Holifield stated that:
 
I am concerned about the potential effects of
 
certain Commission recommendations in the report on
 
Budget and Accounting and therefore make these
 
qualifying observations.
 
The report tends to exalt the role of the
 
accountant in government just as the Commission
 
Report on Legal Services tends to exalt the role of
 
the lawyer in government.
 
l^Ibid., p. 69.
 
Ibid., pp. 70-71.
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The basis for preparing government budgets and
 
for justifying appropriation requests would be
 
drastically revised, with emphasis on cost and
 
accrual accounting and presentation of budget
 
requests in broad.categories.
 
Whether these technical recommendations actually
 
would tighten congressional control of the public
 
purse and bring about improvements in management
 
and greater economies, as claimed, it is difficult
 
to determine. Cost and accrual accounting may be
 
useful in certain agencies engaged in procurement,
 
lending and other business-type operations, but I
 
do not see how these accounting techniques could be
 
applied universally in the government with bene
 
ficial results.
 
Many government operations and services do not
 
lend themselves to commercial accounting treatment,
 
nor can their value to the public always be measured
 
by cost criteria. The government is not a profit-

making organization organized around sales to a
 
market. The perfonnance of its functions does not
 
have the common denominator of dollar returns which
 
can be compared with costs.
 
The end result of the Commission's recommenda
 
tion may be formal consistency in accounting princi
 
ples rather than actual gains in economy and
 
efficiency.
 
While the arguments for the recommendations are pro
 
fessionally oriented and technically provocative, the
 
statements made by the three honorable commissioners, or
 
say their arguments against the recommendations, are realis
 
tically grounded and politically oriented.
 
The controversy over accrued expenditure and accrued
 
cost was discussed by Erie Cato in his critique of the second
 
Hoover Commission report:
 
The accrued expenditure package falls short in
 
three respects. First, it does not provide a firm
 
and positive congressional control over operations
 
and cost of operations and it makes inadequate
 
provision for equivalent agency control at any echelon.
 
^^Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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Second, use of accrued expenditure control will
 
militate against development of accurate costs for
 
use in computing the amount of accrued expenditure
 
appropriations. And, third, it makes no provision
 
whatever for review or control of those items
 
usually reflected in balance sheet accounts. . . .
 
The author is totally unable to understand
 
why the second Hooyer,Commission, having done such
 
an excellent job to the point of determining the
 
control to be used, should have suddenly taken off
 
on the tangent of accrued expenditures. Each step
 
taken led directly towards a single logical con
 
clusion, to control cost. Why, then, did the
 
Commission fail to take that last step, to recom
 
mend appropriations in terms of allowable accrued
 
costs?lo
 
On August 1, 1956, Public Law 84-863 was'enacted
 
and provided for the use of costs in accounting and budget
 
ing in the federal executive agencies. Among the several
 
provisions of this law to implement some of the second
 
Hoover Commission there was the provision mandating that
 
government accounts be maintained and kept on the accrual
 
basis:
 
As soon as practicable after the date of enact
 
ment of this subsection, the head of each executive
 
agency shall, in accordance with principles and
 
standards prescribed by the Comptroller General, cause
 
the accounts of such agency to be maintained on an
 
accrual basis to show the resources, liabilities, and
 
costs of operations of such agency with a view to
 
facilitating the preparation of cost based budgets
 
as required by section 216 of the Budget and
 
Accounting Act, 1921, as amended. The accounting
 
system required by this subsection shall include
 
adequate monetary property accounting records as
 
an integral part of the system.
 
^^Erle Cato, "'Accrued Cost,' Not 'Accrued Expendi
 
tures,' Is the Answer for Government," Accounting Review 34
 
(July 1959):392-98.
 
^'^31 U.S.C. 66 a; 70 Stat. 783 (1956).
 
This law represented, by far and large, a major step forward
 
regarding the accrual method as it made it explicitly manda
 
tory for each agency. The law, however, left off completely
 
the recommendation regarding stating the annual appropria
 
tions on an accrual basis (Recommendation No. 7) as a result
 
of the pressure and insistence of the House of Representatives
 
The exclusion of this recommendation has clearly demonstrated
 
the political-professional controversy over the issue. The
 
major objection of this recommendation to be included in
 
Public Law 84-863 was that:
 
It would necessarily lead to contract authority for
 
programs which extend beyond one fiscal year. It
 
was felt that contract authority weakened congres
 
sional control, and it would not realize the
 
benefits claimed. .. . .^ : ,
 
The concern of the legislative branch over the ques
 
tion of contract authority may be justified. By stating
 
appropriations on the basis of obligational authority, the
 
appropriations in this sense imply the authorization to
 
obligate. This authorization is controlled by Congress. On
 
the other hand, if appropriations have to be stated in terms
 
of accrued expenditures, the implication is that appropria
 
tions will be stated not only in terms of obligations and
 
authorization but would also be stated in terms of what is
 
expected to be received during the year in terms of services
 
"] O
 
°U.S., Senate Committee on Government Operations,
 
Financial Management in the Federal Government (Washington,
 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 93-94.
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and supplies regardless of when obligated. This, in turn,
 
may entail empowering certain agencies contractual authority
 
and might commit funds beyond what Congress may authorize.
 
Two years later, in August Of 1958, Public Law
 
85-759 was enacted providing:
 
Whenever the President determines there has been
 
established a satisfactory system of accrual accounting
 
for an appropriatiqn or fund account, each proposed
 
appropriation thereafter transmitted to the Congress
 
for such account pursuant to the provisions of this
 
Act shall be accompanied by a proposed limitation on
 
annual accrued expenditures. The President may
 
include in the Budget with any such proposed limi
 
tation,on annual accrued expenditures, proposals
 
for provisions authorizing the head of a department
 
or establishment to make transfers, within his
 
department or establishment, between such limitations
 
on annual accrued expenditures; and such provisions
 
may limit by amount or by p^^ centum the size of any
 
transfer so proposed. . . .
 
It should be noted that the tendency of Congress to
 
exercise maximum possible control over the executive budget
 
was a major factor to exclude the recommendation of submitting
 
appropriation on an annual estimated accrued expenditure,
 
from Public Law 14-863 in 1956, when the Congress felt that
 
such a measure would reduce its power of control. Yet, the
 
political spirit soon prevailed and after two years of debate
 
and argument, the result was a political compromise over a
 
technical question. It is called a compromise because Public
 
Law 85-759 of 1958 came to be different from the original
 
Recommendation No. 7 of the second Hoover Conmission,
 
^^31 U.S.C. 11; 42 Stat. 20 (1958)
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mainly to satisfy congressional powers. Should this prove
 
anything, it would prove a major characteristic in govern
 
ment; namely, that technical grounds are not alone sufficient
 
for government decisions and operations. Political grounds
 
come into play with equal, if not sometimes superior, force
 
to shape both decisions and operations. It should be noted
 
that the late President Eisenhower was involved in this
 
matter and urged the Congress on four separate occasions,
 
between 1956 and 1957, to enact the necessary legislation to
 
implement the second Hoover Commission's recommendation
 
regarding the placement of appropriations on an annual
 
accrued expenditure.
 
It was not until August, 1958, when the legislation
 
was enacted that it came to be quite different from the
 
original recommendation, according to the House Committee
 
on Appropriations in I960;. Further, the House Committee on
 
Appropriations in 196Q eliminated budget proposed accrued 
expenditure limitations oh all six appropriations as recom 
mended by the President and did the same thing on all twelve 
■ ■ ■ . ■ .' ^ . 20
appropriations in the 1961 budget. Practically, Public
 
Law 85-759 was not put into operation.
 
As a result of this action (Public Law 85-759 expires
 
on April 1, 1962), Congress or the executive branch
 
Of Government has not had an opportunity to evaluate
 
the results of^the accrued expenditure limitation
 
in operation.
 
70 .
For a detailed narrative on this particular issue,
 
see U.S., Senate Committee on Government Operations,
 
Financial Management in the Federal Government (Washington
 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 98-110.
 
21jj3jLd., p. 110.
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Tiller stated that while the recommendation to change the
 
basis of appropriations fell flat, the message got through
 
that accrual accounting was desirable.
 
In October, 1957, the President's Commission on
 
Budget Concepts reported its recommendations which had the
 
Objective of improving the federal budget and making it i
 
more useful. Among its major recommendations, there was one
 
related to the accrual concept. The fifth recommendation,
 
of a total of thirteen recommendations, came to read:
 
"^With respect to timing, the Commission recom
 
mends that budget expenditures and receipts be
 
reported on an accrual basis instead of the present
 
cash basis. . . .
 
This is a logical use of the modern cost account
 
ing systems which most government agencies have
 
adopted in recent years, and will result in budget
 
totals which provide a better measure of the impact
 
of government activities on the economy. This change
 
cannot be affected immediately, but apparently can be
 
done for expenditures and for corporation income
 
taxes and certain other receipts beginning With the
 
presentation in January, 1970 of the President's
 
budget for fiscal year 1971.22 ;
 
Notable here is the exclusion of individual income
 
tax which, according to the Commission, required further
 
study. The Commission maintained an intelligible distinc
 
tion among appropriations, obligations, accrued expenditures,
 
and program costs. Appropriations are the initial point of
 
decision by Congress regarding the magnitude and direction
 
of government expenditures. Obligations represent that part
 
of appropriation which has been legally committed. Accrued
 
expenditures are a measure of the value of goods and services
 
received by a government agency and are a measure of the
 
^^Report of the President's Commission on Budget
 
Concepts (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
 
1967), pp. 7-8.: 1
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economic impact of government activities. Program costs
 
represent resources actually consumed, regardless of when
 
they were acquired. i
 
It is clear, then, that there is a difference
 
between accrued expenditures and costs'. The Commission,
 
however, emphasized the accrued expenditure concept as a
 
measurement for understanding the economic impact of the
 
federal budget and for fostering the concept of cost control.
 
Speahirig Of the accrual concept in the federal gov
 
ernment, Professors Anthony and Herzlinger made the following
 
comment on the Commission's recommendation:
 
Indeed, the whole movement received something ,
 
of a setback in 1967 when a prestigious cornmittee
 
recommended that the basic concepts should be
 
"accrued expenditures," which is just enough dif
 
ferent from, and inferior to, true accrual account
 
ing to muddy the water.
 
This argument is similar to that made by Cato in
 
1959 when he criticized the accrued expenditure concept as
 
contained in the second Hoover Commission report. They
 
share the view that "accrued expenditure" is inferior to
 
"accrued cost," when in fact each concept serves to communi
 
cate a different type of information. The former is widely
 
held to measure the economic impact of government operations;
 
the latter serves to measure the cost of these operations.
 
^^Ibid.:, pp. 36-46.
 
24
 
Robert N. Anthony and Regina E. Herzlinger,
 
Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations (Homewood,
 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), p. 53.
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It is clear that the President's Commission had dif
 
ferent views from both those offered by the first Hoover
 
Commission task force and the second Hoover Commission.
 
While the task force of the first Hoover Commission suggested
 
that the cash basis be completelY ruled out, the President's
 
Commission emphasized the^ significance of cash receipt and
 
expenditure information when xt stated:
 
The proposed accrual concept cannot replace cash
 
receipt and expenditure information for Treasury cash
 
balance management and public debt management. Cash
 
records are indispensable for the proper discharge
 
of the Treasury's role of banker for the Government. ...
 
Reporting of expenditure on an accrual basis
 
will not impinge in any way on the present appropria
 
tions process. . . . i Appropriations will continue
 
to be the critical point of congressional control
 
over the expenditure process. . .
 
Also, while the second Hoover Commission recommended that
 
appropriation be on an annual accrued expenditure basis, the
 
President's Commission did not contemplate any change on the
 
then present appropriation process.
 
The President's Commission believed that it was
 
possible to implement its recommendation on the accrual basis
 
■ ■ ■ i ■ ' ■ ■ ■ ' . 
according to the followinjg target dates:
 
1. July 1, 1968, for review, testing, and internal
 
monthly reporting of accrued expenditures for most of the
 
government.
 
2. January, 1970, accrued expenditure data to be
 
available for President's budget for,fiscal year 1971.
 
^^Report of the President's Commission on Budget
 
Concepts, pp. 39-40.
 
3. July 1, 1970, to be the starting date to report
 
monthly expenditures to tjhe public on the accrual basis.
 
The provision of a time table to implement the
 
recommendation on accrual accounting represented a positive
 
step on the part of the President's Commission. In general,
 
when a goal is sought to be achieved, it is a sound practice
 
to set a target date for Jthe goal to be attained through a
 
series of mileposts within a schedule.
 
In 1968, the three central entities responsible for
 
the financial management marshalled their efforts to bring
 
about the changeover to the accrual method. The Bureau of
 
the Budget (currently the Office of Management and Budget)
 
issued its Bulletin Number 68-10 on April 26, which provided
 
federal agencies with information and instructions. The
 
General Accounting Office issued its instructions on May 4, >
 
and the Treasury Department issued its instructions on
 
June 20. Each of the three entities gave instructions within
 
the scope of its responsibilities.
 
On February 22, 1969 former President Nixon, in a
 
memorandum to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the
 
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Council
 
of Bconoraic Advisors, stated in part:
 
The accrual basis of accounting has long been
 
recognized as the most appropriate basis for pro
 
viding a fair disclosure of financial condition and
 
pperating results in the private sector of our
 
nation's business. Since 1956, accrual accounting
 
has been a statutory standard for the government
 
itself, but one which has been but imperfectly
 
achieved. . .
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I hereby reaffirm the objective of placing our
 
budgets and financial^reports on the accrual basis
 
recommended by the President's Commission. Please
 
continue vigorous joint effort with the Comptroller
 
General of the United States to that end. I am
 
expecting the heads of the various departments and
 
agencies to give their personal attention toward
 
/	 achieving this objective at the earliest practicable
 
date, but not later than the end of this fiscal
 
year, so that the conversion can be made effective
 
with the budget to be transmitted to Congress in
 
January 1971.
 
The target data could not be met, however. In
 
April, 1970, the Bureau of the Budget allowed agencies to
 
report their 1972 budget figures on a modified accrual
 
basis; but in September, 1970, the modified accrual basis
 
instructions were rescinded, and the cash basis was
 
restored for the 1972 budget. The target for the accrual
 
basis was moved to the 1973 budget.
 
Thirty years after the concept was first introduced,
 
the achievement is not commensurate with the degree of
 
support and efforts demonstrated. Three prestigious com
 
missions recommended its application. The - Budget and
 
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 implied it. Public Law
 
84-863 in 1956 explicitly made it mandatory. Late President
 
Eisenhower endorsed it; former President Nixon confirmed it;
 
and the Treasury Department, the Office of Management and
 
Budget, and the General Accounting Office rallied their
 
' ' ■ . ^ ' ■ ■ 	 ■ ■ 
efforts through bulletins and instructions, to implement it.
 
' ■ O 
U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
 
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
 
Register, National Archives and Record Service, 1968 - ),
 
Richard M. Nixon, 1969.
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However, in his annual report for 1977, the Comp
 
troller General of the United States maintained that:
 
The approval of 14 Department of Defense accounting
 
systems and 7 civil department and agency systems
 
during fiscal year 1977 brought the total number
 
of system designs approved by the Comptroller
 
General to 198, or 60 percent.
 
The Comptroller General, on another occasion, stated
 
the same fact in a different way when he mentioned that:
 
Twenty-seven years ago, the Congress passed the
 
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. . . .
 
When Congress passed that bill I am sure it never
 
suspected that 27 years later 40 percent of the
 
eligible government accounting systems would still
 
not be approved. But that is the case. At this
 
time 132 accounting systems in 34 agencies remain
 
unapproved,^^
 
The Comptroller General implied that the accrual
 
method of accounting is a part of this problem when he '
 
stated on the same occasion that:
 
It means they (government accountants) must con
 
stantly do more to convince their management that...
 
good accounting means accounting on the accrual
 
basis in accordance with the Comptroller General's
 
prescribed principles and standards.
 
Further, there is no assurance to date that financial
 
reporting is made on the accrual basis. According to the
 
30
 
Appendix to the Budget for Fiscal Year 1979, the following
 
conclusions may be drawn:
 
^"^U.S., Comptroller General, 1977 Annual Report
 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 53.
 
^^Elmer Staats, U.S., Comptroller General,"A Good
 
Accounting System--A Key to Good Management," Journal of
 
Accountancy (February 1978):66-69. ,
 
^^Ibid.
 
on
 
See Appendix C. Only a few programs within some
 
departments were selected.
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1. There is still a heavy emphasis placed on the
 
concept of obligations.
 
2. The term "change in selected resources" as it
 
appears in the Budget Appendix means obligations or commit
 
ments for undelivered orders and which is added to the
 
funded program costs. The term cannot be construed to mean
 
changes in costs on the accrual basis.
 
In light of the foregone historical background and
 
developments, two questions emerge and seem persistent:
 
Firstly, during the past thirty years, what could
 
conceivably have been the problems impeding full conversion
 
to the accrual method in the federal government?
 
Secondly, regardless of full or partial conversion,
 
is it really necessary to apply the concept of the accrual
 
method in the federal government?
 
While some of the answers were provided in the course
 
of the historical development, it is commendable to treat
 
the answers to these two questions in more depth in the
 
following chapters, beginning with an identification of the
 
problems that have been facing the application of the concept.
 
CHAPTER IV
 
THE ACCRUAL METHOD IN PERSPECTIVE:
 
AN ANALYSIS. OF THE PROBLEMS
 
The historical acGount provided for in the preceding
 
chapter was concluded by raising two logical questions.
 
These questions deal with the problems that have been
 
impeding the progress in applying the accrual method in the
 
government for thirty years, and whether it is necessary to
 
apply the concept of accrual accdunting in the federal
 
government.
 
The first question could be viewed as an analysis
 
of the constraints which the concept has undeirgone. The
 
second question in essence is an analysis of the pros and
 
cons regarding accrual accounting in the government.
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and
 
identify the problems; the next chapter is devoted to an
 
analysis of the pros and cons. Finally, a conclusion is
 
provided in the last chapter.
 
It should be noted that the discussion and analysis
 
in this chapter and the next two chapters are related to
 
the accrual method in terms of accrued costs, accrued
 
revenue, and determination of assets and liabilities.
 
For the past thirty years there have been several
 
■ : 62 : ' ■ ■ ■ ■ 
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problems which have impeded a wide andVsuccessful applica 
tion of one of the most cherished concepts of the accounting 
profession. Many of these problems continue and will con 
tinue to function as constraints in the face of a wide and 
successful application of the accrual method and, 'as such, 
can be used as arguments against it. 
These problems may be classified in terms of a 
variety of administrative, behavioral, technical, and 
political constraints. 
Administrative Constraints 
According to the General Accounting Office, many 
factors have contributed to the lack of faster progress in 
installing accrual accounting methods. The following are 
the administrative constraints contributing to the slow 
progress: 
1. Lack of top management interest in the subject. 
2. Lack of leadership 	within an agency, 
3. Slow development of work measurement and 
program performance standards for use with cost data. 
4. Inadequate funds. 
5. Priority concern with other matters. 
6. 	 Lack of understanding of usefulness to manage­
. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ 1' ■ • ' ■ ' 
ment of the reliable cost and financial information. 
^U.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked 
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government 
(Washington, D.C.: 1970) , pp. 30-31. 
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In short, lack of management support has been a
 
primary constraint. This is very true because management
 
support is a prerequisite for successful system implementa
 
tion. The adequacy of funds is an essential factor because
 
it is a well known fact that the cost of any system tends to
 
be high in its early stages of design and implementation.
 
This is due to the studies and analytical work that should
 
be performed, in addition to the training of employees,
 
testing and verifying results, purchasing of new forms; and,
 
in many" instances, both the old and the new systems are run
 
parallel to each other for a period of time until the old
 
system is phased out. Further, there is the extra time,
 
effort, and costs associated with closing the books at year
 
end, reconciling, and adjusting the accounts. VJhen funds
 
available are barely sufficient to meet an agency's mission,
 
it is less likely that management would allocate part of its
 
already scarce resources to other activities. The lack of
 
understanding on the part of the management of reliable cost
 
and financial information could be due to "failure of account
 
ants to convince agency management that better accounting is
 
worthwhile."
 
The truth is that it is not lack of understanding
 
but rather lack of belief on the part of management of the
 
usefulness of reliable cost and financial information. First,
 
when we speak of top management at the federal level we are
 
n
 
Elmer Staats, U.S., Comptroller General, "A Good
 
Accounting System--A Key to Good Management Journal of
 
Accountancy .(February 1978):66-69. .
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speaking of administration; and since administration is not
 
separate from politics, administrators know that their
 
decisions are primarily political rather than economical
 
and, consequently, they have not had such a firm belief
 
that their decisions should necessarily be based on
 
strictly cost data and financial information as in the
 
case of the private sector enterprises. Secondly,
 
agency administrators could have been reluctant to spend
 
monies, time, and effort for the changeover to the accrual
 
method when in fact "it is not likely that anyone can prove
 
subsequently what cost reductions have occurred because
 
management will have better financial information under the
 
accrual basis.
 
Behavioral Constraints
 
There is a common agreement among behavioral scien
 
tists that organizational change often results in resistance
 
on the part of employees. Several theories are offered to
 
explain this phenomenon. The tension release theories of
 
human behavior are but examples of such theories. Basically,
 
employees are psychologically comfortable with familiar pro
 
cedures. When they are called upon for a change, they are
 
expected to change their established patterns of behavior.
 
The pressures to cope with the new system, coupled with fear
 
of failure, result in feelings of alienation and insecurity.
 
3
 
Carl W. Tiller, "Why Accrual Accounting?" Defense
 
Management Journal 5 (Summer 1969);29.
 
Consequently, resistance occurs until such feelings are gone.
 
The General Accounting Office stated that lack of
 
enthusiasm for change was among the factors that contributed
 
to lack of faster progress in installing the accrual method.
 
The insensitivity to and resistance towards change
 
have been known as the inertia of bureaucracy. This is a
 
kind of rigidity that grows out of prolonged role enactment.
 
Thompson maintained that:
 
Dependence-^ upon specialization imparts to modern
 
organizations certain qualities. Among these are
 
routinization, strong attachment to subgoals,
 
impersonality, categorization, resistance to change.
 
It has to be understood that many of the managerial
 
and accounting techniques have evolved in the private sector
 
Over a relatively long period of time. The case in govern
 
ment is somewhat different. Too many techniques have been,
 
in the past twenty-five years, introduced to the public
 
agencies, ppBS, MBO, and ZBB. The natural result
 
is confusion and role conflict on the part of both the admin
 
istration and the employees who were required to comprehend,
 
implement, and cope with these various techniques. It is
 
possible to conclude that some adverse behavioral implications
 
have occurred. First, shifting emphasis,from one technique
 
■^Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Bureaupath­
ology," quoted in David R. Hampton, Charles E. Summer and 
Ross A. Webber, Organizational Behavior and the Practice of 
Management (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973) , 
p. 405. 
■ 
to another over a short period of time creates nothing but
 
lack of confidence in what is being done. Second, with the
 
demise of PPBS coupled with the lack of follow up to
 
enforce accrual accounting and the changing emphasis towards
 
other techniques such as MBQ and ZBB, it has created a
 
feeling among federal employees that nothing is really
 
serious about any technique. As a matter of fact, the
 
demise of PPBS has probably fostered federal employees'
 
feelings that their own way of doing things is the best;
 
and, thus, they tend to enhance their resistance against
 
any other technique.
 
Technical Constraints
 
Among the reasons cited by the General Accounting
 
Office was the shortage of technically qualified personnel.^
 
Federal accountants have long been experienced in government
 
accounting following the obligation method of accounting.
 
To deplore lack of technically qualified personnel would be
 
unfair because they are not expected to be familiar with
 
accrual accounting, and it is not the accrual method that
 
makes the technicariy qualified accountants.
 
Another meaning could be associated with the tech
 
nically qualified personnel. It is possible that the lack
 
of systems analysts and systems accountants who are a major
 
U.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
 
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government
 
(Washington, B.C.: 1970), pp. 30-31.
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force that deals with fiscal systems is causing the problem.
 
Exactly what is meant iDy lack of technically qualified per
 
sonnel was not clarified by the General Accounting Office.
 
On the other hhnd, the meaning of the accrual method
 
has not been clearly defined. Whether it means a modified
 
accrual system, accrued expenditure, or accrued costs is not
 
yet precise. There isino doubt, however, that this adds to
 
the technical difficuli:ies in applying the concept in practice.
 
This point will be further analyzed under the pros and cons
 
for the accrual method;.
 
Political Constraints
 
The administrative, behavioral, and technical con
 
straints may be viewed!as common systems problems which
 
could be overcome. Thbse constraints, alonb, cannot last
 
for thirty years. The:government does not lack the experts
 
to solve these problems, nor does it take these experts
 
thirty years to solve the problems.
 
The real factors behind this lag in applying the
 
accrual method are strictly political. After thirty years
 
it can be safely concluded that political constraints repre
 
sent the major stumblihg block. Political constraints, in
 
contrast to the other constraints, can stand alone and last
 
fcr many years. |, ' • ~
 
According to the Gbneral Accounting Office, lack of
 
conviction that Gongrehs meant what it said in the law about
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accounting improvements was among the problems impeding
 
faster progress toward;adoption of the accrual method. It
 
was demonstrated in the preceding chapter that three members
 
of the second Hoover Commission dissented from the recommenda
 
tions related to accrual accounting and budgeting. It was
 
also shown that Congress defeated the recommendation regarding
 
the appropriations in terms of estimated annual accrued expen-,,
 
ditures. Also, the passage of Public Law 84-863, in 1956,
 
has never meant so farjthat Congress is really behind it. It
 
appears likely-that had Congress been in complete support of
 
the concept, the appliGation would have become a reality a
 
long time ago, as in the case with many other recommendations
 
and changes. The truth is that Congress itself is comforta
 
ble with the budgeting and accounting practices as they are.
 
Not only that, but Congress also feels that the budget is its
 
major tool of control over the executive branch and feels that
 
any change in practices might tip the balance of power in
 
favor of the executivejbranch. Stated differently, under a
 
set of practices in budgeting and accounting, there is a
 
pattern of power relationship prevailing between Congress
 
and the executive branch. When this set of practices is
 
changed, chances are that the power relationship will
 
change. Therefore, Congress tends to resist, positively and
 
negatively any change that it feels would decrease its powers.
 
*Ibid., pp. 30-t31
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By positive resistancejis meant that Congress may openly
 
criticize, oppose, andirefrain from making a law to enact or
 
prohibit a -certain measure. By negative resistance is meant
 
that Congress may not Support and push for a certain measure
 
to be put into practice or prohibit it whether there is a
 
law for it or not. Consequently, the mere issuance of a law
 
does not.mean much unlfess Congress is really behind the issue
 
i ■ . . ■ 
and mobilizes its forces for its achievement.
 
On the basis o:^ this analysis, we may state that the
 
recommendation pertaining to reporting the appropriations in
 
terms of estimated annual accrued expenditure was met with a
 
positive resistance, while the accrual concept in government
 
accounting was^met with the negative type of resistance
 
despite the enactment pf Public Law 84-863 in 1956.
 
This negative resistance is exemplified in:
 
a lack of consistent follow up by the Congress on the
 
degree to which policies that they adopted 27 years
 
ago had been put ihto practice by the executive
 
agencies. . . . The failure of both Congress and 0MB
 
to push hard enough for better and approvable account
 
ing systems has resulted in G.A.O.'s being primarily
 
responsible for leadership in this area. While we do
 
not object to this I leadership role, there have been
 
numerous occasions|when we would have welcomed strong
 
support from 0MB and the Congress.7
 
Another illustration of political constraints is the
 
■ ■ . • ■ ■ ■ \ i ■ ■ ■ ' ■ ■ ' 
frequent changes at the highest levels of organizational
 
■ ■ ■ ■ • . ■ . ; • I ■ ■ ■ ■ , • ' ' . ' ■ 
echelon. Such changes are political as they involve secre
 
taries and under-secretaries. This has been brought up by
 
' ■ ■ • ■ ■ i ■ ■■ 
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Elmer Staats,|U.S., Comptroller General, "A Good
 
Accounting System-^A Kpy to Good Management," Journal of
 
Accountancy (February 1978):67-68. .
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Comptroller General Elmer Staats when he stated:
 
First, it is true that in many agencies there
 
have been rather frequent changes in top management
 
not only at the secretarial level but at the assis
 
tant secretary level where accounting responsibili
 
ties lie. This makes it tough for accountants
 
because accounting systems design projects are
 
usually long-term undertakings and are greatly
 
helped by continuity in management. . . ..
 
In our political system, although it is the
 
best in the world, frequent changes in top manage
 
ment iu'the agencies seem unavoidable. . . .
 
Accountants need to do a better job of showing
 
management—including each new management as it
 
comes along—that good accounting systems mean good
 
information and good information means,better and
 
sounder decisions.
 
The government's lack of the kind of managerial
 
continuity often found in industry places a special
 
burden on government accountants and auditors. It
 
means they must continually do more to convince
 
their management that.
 
Good accounting goes beyond mere fund control.
 
Good accounting means accounting on the accrual
 
basis in accordance with the Comptroller General's
 
prescribed principles and standards.
 
Good accounting is worthwhile because it pro
 
vides the basis for sound financial decisions.
 
Good accounting will result in ot>taining the
 
approval of the Comptroller General as required by
 
law.^
 
In summary, a set of constraints, the most powerful
 
of which are political, have impeded a wide application of
 
the concept of accrual accounting, although accepted in
 
principle.
 
The arguments for and against the accrual method in
 
government are discussed in Chapter V.
 
Ibid., p. 67
 
CHAPTER V
 
THE PROS AND CONS FOR THE ACCRUAL METHOD
 
IN GOVERNMENT
 
The proponents of a change, any change, have to dem
 
onstrate and prove two basic points. First, they have to
 
show the inadequacy and/or the weaknesses of the current
 
practices in light of achieving goals; and, second, they have
 
to provide the evidence that the proposed change will achieve
 
those goals which could not be achieved under the current
 
practices, or that the change will better achieve those goals
 
by eliminating the weaknesses of the present practices.
 
The opponents of a change, conversely, have to dem
 
onstrate the adequacy and the strengths of the current
 
practices in terms of achieving goals and have to show that
 
the proposed change will not help in achieving the goals in
 
a better way.
 
This section of the paper is devoted to a discussion
 
and analysis of these two reciprocal positions. Each reason
 
for the change will be followed immediately by its counter
 
part.
 
As a note, the current practices refer to the obliga
 
tion basis of budgeting and accounting as practiced in the
 
federal government. The proposed change is that pertaining
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to the accrual method which recognizes both revenue and cost,
 
regardless of whether cash is received or disbursed.
 
The pros and cons may be grouped under the following
 
major headings:
 
1. Conceptual and terminology problems.
 
2. Effective controls.
 
3. Behavioral aspects.
 
4. Accurate measurement of cost.
 
5. Better information.for decision making.
 
6. The sucGessful experience of the private sector
 
with the accrual method.
 
Following is a discussion and analysis of each of the
 
above major points.
 
Conceptual and Terminology Problems
 
The pros of the change maintain that the term
 
"obligatibns" lacks precise definition and is interpreted
 
differently by many people.^ While the General Accounting
 
Office used to define obligations as the actual and estimated
 
liabilities, the Department of Treasury and the Bureau of the
 
Budget (currently the Office of Management and Budget) defined
 
obligations within legal context (i.e., liabilities arising
 
from .transaGtions such as contracts or services rendered and
 
for which appropriation has been reserved). As a result.
 
^This argument was introduced by the second Hoover
 
Commission in its report in 1955.
 
' 7^
 
there existed no uniform, reliable, or meaningful data on
 
obligations. For example, agencies may report more than one
 
set of figures for the same data which is arrived at according
 
to what is meant by obligations for each set of figures.
 
This, in turn, has resulted in confusion and dissatisfaction
 
by Congress.
 
-This argument, however, does not justify the change
 
from the obligation to the accrual method because the remedy
 
of such deficiency would lie in a coordinated and consistent
 
definition which could be applied to the concept of obliga
 
tions. This is exactly what Congress did by.issuing the
 
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1955. Section 1311 of
 
this act mandated that no amount be recorded as an obligation
 
unless it' is supported by a documentary evidence of a binding
 
agreement, a valid loan agreemerit, an order required by law or
 
issued by law, a grant of subsidy payable, a liability arising
 
from a pending litigation, employment or services, or any
 
other legal liability. This law was construed to constitute
 
a definition of obligatxons.
 
Additionally, the proposed accrual concept is still
 
no less controversial than the obligations concept. According
 
.S., Congress, Senate, Financial Management in the
 
Federal Government,' S. Doc. 11, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961.
 
3
 
Ibid., pp. 85-88.
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to Ticrney and Hoffman:
 
Complicating the lag in implementing a concept
 
of accounting that has been accepted in principle by
 
the private sector is the varying definitions and
 
interpretations of the concepts inherent in accrual
 
accounting.
 
In the government, accrual accounting could refer
 
to accrued expenditures or accrued costs--and a dis
 
tinction is not always maintained. . . .
 
While accrued expenditures refer to liabilities
 
incurred as a result of goods and services received, the
 
accrued costs refer to the costs of resources consumed. The
 
concept is complicated further by the existence of several
 
methods of determining eccrued expenditures:
 
1. The forecast method, under which the estimated
 
liabilities are recorded at the beginning of the accounting
 
period; and as cash payments are made, they are charged
 
against this estimated amount.
 
2. The inventory method, whereby the transaction's
 
are recorded on a cash basis; and at the end of the period,
 
receivables, payables, and other liabilities are inventoried.
 
3. The continuity method, which essentially recog
 
nizes, records, and reports every transaction throughout the
 
accounting period.
 
Needless to say, each method yields a different set
 
of results on the accrued expenditures.
 
Most importantly is the view that there is not much
 
'^Gornelius E. Tierney and Robert D. Hoffman, Federal
 
Financial Management's Accounting and Auditing Practices
 
(New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
 
19761, p. 90.
 
^Ibid., pp. 90-95.
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difference between obligations, accrued expenditures, and
 
costs, when the transactions are incurred and settled
 
immediately or after, a relatively short period of time. The
 
impact of this view is the different explanations of
 
"immediate or relatively short period of time." Under such
 
circumstances, there will not be a consistent reporting
 
approach among various agencies or even within the same
 
agency from one period to another.
 
In short, the observation that the critiques pointed
 
to the obligation concept is also true for the accrual
 
concept, which seems not to haye avoided the weaknesses of
 
the obligation method in terms of lack of precise definition
 
and various interpretations.
 
Effective Controls
 
The pros of the change to the accrual method argue
 
that the obligation method is not an effective instrument of
 
control. This criticism was pointed out by the second Hoover
 
Commission in 1955. Professors Anthony and Herzlinger went
 
even further by stating that "failure to use accrual account
 
ing is a fundamental weakness in some management control
 
systems; without it, other desirable control techniques are
 
6
 
not possible.
 
Robert N. Anthony and Regina E. Herzlinger, Mangement
 
Control in Nonprofit Organizations (Homewood, Illinois:
 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), p. 340.
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This argument, however, seems to have missed the
 
basic characteristic of the federal budget and accounting
 
which essentially is geared towards controlling the expendi­
tures of government. The President's Commission on Budget
 
Concepts emphasized, in it report, that recording obligations
 
is essential for finaricial control and accountability of
 
agency appropriations and that appropriations will continue
 
to be the critical point o: congressional control over the
 
expenditure process. Further, had the obligation concept
 
been useless in terms of controls, it would have been abandoned
 
with the advent of the accrual system. The fact is that the
 
obligation concept is stil , and will continue to be, opera­
tive as an instrument of control and as an important point
 
in the life cycle of federa1 transactions. According to
 
Walter Held, there are at east six points of control in the
 
7 ■ 
federal fiscal process. Chronologically, these points are
 
authorization,'appropriation, obligations, accrued expendi­
'> , ^
 
ture, applied cost, and expenditure or disbursement point,
 
Following is a discussion f each point:
 
1. The first point of control is the authorization
 
bill whereby approval is granted to embark on an activity
 
or a program requiring future expenditures. This is the
 
strongest point of control because of the possibility of
 
stopping the activity or program at this early stage.
 
Walter G. Held, S/stemic Improvement in the Federal
 
Budgetary Process, quoted in The Federal Expenditure Policy
 
for Economic Growth and Stability by the Joint Economic
 
Committee (Washington, D.C Government Printing Office,
 
1957), pp. 455-76. \
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2. The second point of control is the determination
 
of the level of spending or the ceiling. This point is known
 
as the appropriatiph, where the dollar amount is approved.
 
3. The thirdsp of control is the recording of
 
legal obligations. ; T is important since each agency has
 
to keep track of the ampunts of goods or services that have
 
been ordered so as to have a running record of how much
 
' ■ . ■ ■ ■h 	 i ^ ^ . 8 ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
spending authbrity has been used and how much is left. 
4. The . fourth pPint of control arises, when ^the goods 
and/or services are delivered. The accrued expenditure is 
recorded at this time, thus showing the liability of the 
agency. 	■ 
5. The fifth point of control is incurred when con 
sumption takes place. This is known as applied cost. 
6. The 	sixth point of control is the expenditure 
point. 	 This is the point at which actual payment is made. 
According to Walter Held: 
Obviously, the point of control which is most 
effective is that which occurs nearest the 
beginning of the process. The resulting points g
of control generally speaking are governed by it. 
Additionally, it is hard to accept the view that 
absence of accrual accounting is a fundamental weakness in a 
.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked 
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government 
(Washington, D,C. : Government Printing Office, 1970) , p. 30. 
Held, Systemic Improvement in the Federal Budgetary 
Process, pp. 455-76. 
management control system. First, management control is not
 
a result of, neither is it a by-product of, the accrual
 
method. ^ SecondlY, the existence and application of an accrual
 
method does not always mean that there is a strong management
 
control system.: Third, the American Institute of Certified
 
■ 10' 
Fublic Accounts emphasized the authorization of transactions
 
as an important point of cohtrol, a notion upheld in the
 
federal fiscal process. Very important is the statement that
 
"there are inherent limitations that should be recognized in
 
considering the potential effectivenss of any system of
 
accounting controls. The American Institute of Certified
 
Public AccQuntants recites such limitations as those arising
 
from errors of misunderstanding, carelessness> or mistakes
 
of judgment. Another example of the limits of any system
 
of control would be collusion in those instances where effec
 
tive controls are predicated on"segregation of duties.
 
The point here is that it takes more than the accrual
 
method to achieve and maintain an effective control system.
 
Also, there is no guarantee that the accrual method will
 
always be coupled with ah effective control system.
 
Behayioral Aspects
 
The second Hopyer Commission, in its report in 1955,
 
^^Tho American Institute of Certified Public
 
Accountants, Statements on Auditing Standards #1 (New York:
 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.,
 
1973), pp. 18-20. 'V
 
^^Ibid., p. 22. .
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criticized the obligation basis of appropriations as an
 
incentive in the agencies to use all available obligational
 
authority (currently known as budget authority) because such
 
action tends to strengthen the agency budget requests in the
 
following year. In fact, this is a behavioral problem which
 
is related to the overall system rather than to the obligation
 
method alone. To attribute this problem to the obligation
 
method is an oversimplification. The budget authority in one
 
year is used as a base for the following year's budget.
 
Accordingly, if not all the budget authority is used by the
 
agency, chances are that the savings will be allocated to
 
another agency. This has been expressed by John^Cooley,when
 
he stated:
 
An important missing ingredient in federal systems
 
has been inability to allow managers to benefit from
 
efficiencies. . . .
 
As no ready measure of success and no easy way to
 
reward successful federal managers has been found,
 
the selfish advantage of a federal manager often is
 
served by keeping the budget high--by building
 
empires.
 
Speaking of this behavioral aspect, Thomas Anton
 
spcxe of the first budget rule:
 
Spend all of your appropriation and, if possible,
 
a little bit more.
 
Failure to use up an appropriation indicates that
 
the full amount was unnecessary in the first place,
 
which in turn implies that the Budgetary Commission
 
did not do its job. Such an implicit slap in the
 
^^John W. Cooley, "The Federal Accountant's Role ,in
 
Providing Organizational Incentives," The Federal Accountant
 
20 (December 1971):3-19. ^
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Commission's face is extremely dangerous and can
 
lead to a reduction in the next appropriation.13
 
The problem is then behavioral with some political
 
implications. After an agency advocates its budget request,
 
it could be politically embarrassing for the agency itself
 
and to the appropriation committee as well if the approved
 
level of spending is not used up.
 
In the private sector, managers are rewarded through
 
a variety of financial incentives such as commissions, bonuses,
 
or salary increases, when they achieve their goals at less
 
than the budgeted or anticipated cost. This constitutes a
 
motivating force to them, which is not available to their
 
counterparts in government.'
 
With the absence of personal financial incentives,
 
political incentive functions as a motivating force for gov
 
ernment managers. This political incentive is best exemplified
 
in terms of high budget figures and higher levels of spending,
 
which together are a symbol of political power, prestige,
 
and high regard of the agency's mission.
 
^ This makes it clear that the overall federal system,
 
and not only the obligation basis of budgeting and account
 
ing which lacks alternative incentives, is responsible for the
 
behavior of federal managers to spend all, or even more than,
 
what has been appropriated to strengthen their budget requests.
 
13Thomas J. Anton, "Agency Budget Roles," quoted in
 
Robert Golembiewski and Jack Rabin, Eds., Public Budgeting and
 
Finance, Readings in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Chicago; ~
 
F. E. Peacock Publishing, Inc., 1975), p. 207.
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It follows that the remedy lies not in changing the obliga
 
tion method to the accrual method, but rather it lies in the
 
search for alternative incentives, an endeavor that goes
 
beyond the realm of accrual accounting.
 
Further, accrual accounting measures the cost of
 
achieving the goals or the budget targets. Included in this
 
cost figure is the cost of performance, which is simply the
 
labor cost. Because the budget has an impact on the behavior
 
of employees and, consequently, on their performance, the
 
measurement of cost will include any inefficiencies that
 
occurred in the course of performance. By using this cost
 
figure as a base for budget estimates, we are running the
 
risk of incorporating one year's inefficiencies into the
 
following year's budget. The point here is that accrual
 
accounting is not free from behavioral implications exactly^
 
as the obligation method is not.
 
Recent research has proved the relation between
 
budgets and human behavior. This is equally true both in
 
the private and public sectors. In affecting the human
 
behavior, it is affecting the human performance and, conse
 
quently, impacting efficiency and productivity.
 
Schiff and Lewin, on the basis of three case studies,
 
showed that managers actively participate in the budget
 
process and bargain for slack to insure attainment of goals,
 
to avoid consequences of failure in achieving higher goals,
 
and to achieve personal goals. They maintain that ". . . to
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the firm this unexpected behavior results in lost opportuni-
V- :: ' ■ . " '14 "' 
ties and in,the long run increases its cost function."
 
The accrual method here will measure costs as incurred
 
includirig any ihefficiencies. Since the budget serves as a
 
planning as well as a control tool, both authors stated that:
 
The dual role of budgets has many dysfunctional con
 
sequences and largely accounts for most of the
 
behavioral- studies on budgets. Dysfunctional
 
consequences occur because budgets can be used to
 
induce pressure and to impose goals on the organiza
 
tion participants.
 
The discussion just presented shows that behavioral
 
aspects in the budgetary process are equally applicable to
 
both private and government organizations and that the accrual
 
method does not provide a remedy in either type of organization,
 
Finally, when the accrual method becomes widely
 
implemented, it will not substitute the obligation basis,
 
but rather will constitute an additional step in the fiscal
 
cycle. This may even foster the behavioral problems when cost
 
figures are exaggerated or manipulated, intentionally or
 
unintentionally, through individual judgment, errors, or
 
accounting changes.
 
Accurate Measurement of Cost
 
The proponents of accrual accounting maintain that
 
^■^Michael Schiff and Arie Y. Lewin, Behavioral Aspects 
of Accounting (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1974) , p. 119. 
y ^^Ibid., p. 118. 
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the obligation method of accounting falls short in measuring
 
the cost of federal programs. Und-er traditional practices
 
of budgeting and accounting, neither Congress nor the agency
 
management is aware of the cost of carrying out federal pro
 
grams. In order to know the accurate cost, the accrual
 
method has to be adopted since it provides for an accurate
 
measurement of resources consumed as opposed to mere cash
 
outlays or obligations incurred.
 
In general, the accrual method of accounting better ^ 
 
reflects the costs of a specific function over a certain
 
period of time. This has been very true in private sector
 
organizations. That the accrual method would easily provide
 
accurate cost measurement in government is questionable.
 
First of all, intergovernmental fiscal relations
 
present a challenge to what the accrual method can accomplish
 
in terms of cost measurement. Many federal programs are
 
delegated to State and local governments for implementation.
 
This takes the form of grants in aid, subsidies, and contri
 
butions. Federal government reimburses these levels of
 
government for the costs they incur in the course of adminis
 
tering those programs. Since the majority of State and local
 
governments adopt the cash, or at best, the modified accrual
 
basis, there is no way to ascertain that what the federal gov
 
ernment pays is representative of the true cost of any program.
 
Unless all states and local governments adopt the accrual
 
basis and follow the same cost accounting procedures
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consistently, there is no way to know the real cost of any
 
program.
 
Additionally, in many grant programs the federal gov
 
ernment may set a limit or a ceiling as to what may be reim
 
bursed to the State or local government. Thus, the cost for
 
the federal government is the actual cash outlay paid which
 
does not necessarily agree with the true cost as arrived at
 
by the grantee departments administering the programs.
 
There is little, if anything at all, that the accrual method
 
can offer under these circumstances.
 
Further, in determining the cost of any program, the
 
federal government maintains a distinction between allowable
 
cost and unallowable cpst.^^ Allowable cost is reimburseable
 
while unallowable cost is not. As State and local governments
 
submit their claims for reimbursement, they only reflect
 
allowable costs which are not the same as total or actual
 
costs. If both allowable and unallowable costs constitute
 
the total cost of a program, what difference does it make to
 
adopt the accrual method if cost reports are based only on
 
the allowable costs? It is clear that it will not make any
 
difference since the cost is not accurately measured.
 
^^U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
 
A Guide for State and Local Government Agencies, Cost Princi
 
ples and Procedures in Establishing Cost Allocation Plans
 
and Cost Rates for Grants and Contracts with the Federal
 
Government, OASC-10 (This document contains GSA Federal
 
Management Circular 74-4 formerly known as 0MB Circular A-87),
 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).
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There are several federal agencies whose obligations
 
are primarily geared towards payment of grants, subsidies,
 
and other programs administered by other levels of government.
 
For example, of an estimated obligation incurred of $54,836
 
million in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
 
in 1978, $47,863 million was estimated for grants, subsi
 
dies, and contributions. Whether the entire amount or part
 
of it is liquidated before the end of the fiscal year, the
 
accrual method of accounting is insignificant because this
 
this will be the amount spent regardless of costs of the
 
programs administered by other government levels and because
 
17
 
the latter will report only the allowable costs. According
 
to the General Accounting Office:
 
For some types of programs where cash advanced to
 
grantees by the federal government is kept closely
 
associated with the cash'needs of the grantees to pay
 
their bills, the difference between cash disbursements
 
by the federal government and accrued expenditures
 
for a given month, measured by the accrued costs and
 
expenses of the grantees, will not be great.
 
Unfortunately, few federal agency grantees as yet
 
keep their accounting records on the accrual basis.
 
Thus data for making a comparison between cash and
 
accrued expenditure data for specific periods are not
 
readily available.
 
Because of the inability to determine the true costs
 
of federal programs administered by State and local govern
 
ments, while a federal agency is liable for reimbursing
 
states or local governments for administering certain
 
programs, it becomes evident that the term "accrued costs"
 
^"^See Appendix D.
 
l^U.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
 
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government
 
(Washington, D .C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 30.
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is misleading and that the term "accrued expenditure" is more
 
relevant under the circumstances-. Thus, at the end of the fis
 
cal year the unpaid balance to State and local governments
 
becomes a liability on the part of the federal agency when there
 
is evidence that those other levels of government have fulfilled
 
their obligation according to the terms of the programs.
 
Secondly, in some federal agencies a substantial
 
portion of expenditures is directed towards salaries, wages,
 
and related benefits, the obligation of which is liquidated
 
19
 
over a period not exceeding one month. This is coupled with
 
the fact that accrued annual leave is an unfunded liability
 
until the time it is taken. This,annual leave is recognized
 
as a cost only when it is taken rather than when it is earned.
 
Thus, cost of labor is distorted under such practices.
 
In addition, those agencies whose budgets consist
 
mostly of salaries and related employee benefits will not
 
have much difference between accrual accounting and cash
 
accounting. According to the General Accounting Office,
 
"For a year, the difference would be relatively small, assum-'
 
ing no major increase or decrease in the volume of work
 
20
 
performed. . . ."
 
: Thirdly, to advocate the accrual method on the grounds
 
that it is more relevant to the concept and the trend
 
towards program budgeting, since it makes it possible to
 
measure the cost of federal programs, seems like putting the
 
cart before the horses. There are problems in designing a
 
^^See Appendix E.
 
20u.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
 
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government,
 
P• •
 
 program structure; there are programs that do not coincide
 
with the organizational structure of an agency; and there
 
are programs that cross organizational lines. Further
 
problems !arise from the fact that . . programs are
 
fictional, in the sense that they cannot be physically ,
 
' . 21
 
identified in terms of organizational units."
 
These problems and complexities need to be solved,
 
and coordination heeds to be maintained among various divisions
 
within an agency and among various agencies. Then, and only
 
then, can the accrual method be advocated. The task of
 
tracing a program cost, which transcends organizational lines,
 
is horrehdous. Unless the^agencies involved achieve the
 
utmost consistency in the accounting method and procedures
 
and cost accounting practices, the cost information will be
 
less than reliable.
 
Finally, cost figures do not tell much about effiqi­
ency or effectiveness unless they are compared with a
 
standard—the cost of a similar activity--or evaluated in
 
terms of the benefits derivedi Questions related to the
 
efficiency and effectiveness of government operations are
 
still far better than the answers. The product of government
 
activities is intangible in nature and hard to measure in
 
terms of true actual costs. The effectiveness is even more
 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure. The uniqueness of
 
^^Robert D. Lee, Jr., and Ronald W. Johnson, Public
 
Budgeting Systems (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1975),
 
p. 267.
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government programs makes it difficult to compare their costs
 
since they are not duplicated elsewhere. With the govern
 
ment embarking on new programs and subprograms, uncertainty
 
surrounds cost estimates. When a program is discontinued,
 
everyone seems to be at a loss regarding the meaning of the
 
cost figures. Was it high? Was it low? Was the program
 
efficient? When programs are continued from one year to
 
the next, we are left with the alternative of comparing
 
costs from one year to the next.. This involves the risk of
 
carrying and comparing the inefficiencies from one year to
 
the next, particularly when behavioral implications, as
 
explained earlier, are introduced in the budget process.
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of government programs
 
requires first ah identification of what goals are sought
 
to be achieved and then a measurement of what was actually
 
achieved against what was intended and at what cost.
 
Aside from the fact that a precise definition of
 
intended objective of certain programs is a very difficult
 
task because of the high levels of abstraction dealt with,
 
evaluation and assessment of program objectives are surrounded
 
with insoluble problems.
 
The program may impact more than one area in society.
 
It may achieve its goals only after long periods of time. It
 
may benefit other areas than were originally intended, and it
 
may answer to a moral standard cherished by the people. To ,
 
try to evaluate the program under such circumstances, in
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terms of cost-benefit analysis, is really ah attempt to
 
measure the immeasurable.
 
Better Information for pecision Making
 
Advocates of the accrual method maintain that by
 
adopting the accrual method better information can be pro
 
duced in regard to costs, revenues, assets, and liabilities
 
of federal agencies and various federal programs. The
 
information, then, can be used in the decision-making
 
process. They also argue that better information through
 
accrual accounting leads to better decisions in terms of
 
efficient utilization of resources, cost controls, and plan
 
ning for the future operations.
 
This argument should be broken down to its elements.
 
On the question of oasts, it has already been demonstrated
 
that under the pattern of ihtergovernmental relations in
 
terms of grants, subsidies, and contributions, the accrual
 
method falls short in achieving an accurate measurement of
 
costs. In those instances where the majority of an agency's
 
expenditures is in the form of grants, the difference between
 
cash and the accrual basis is not going to be significant
 
and, consequently, the effort spent in installing and main
 
taining the accrual method is not worthwhile. Where a
 
federal agency's expenditures are primarily spent for
 
salaries and wages and related employee benefits, the annual
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difference between the cash and accrual basis is not signifi
 
cant; hence, it is not justifiable. In all those instances,
 
the cost of establishing and maintaining the accrual system
 
is not justifiable in terms of the information produced. A
 
glance at the federal agencies will reveal that the majority
 
falls in either category-:-large grant programs category or
 
large spending, in proportion to total spending on salaries,
 
wages, and employee benefits category. A few additional
 
comments will be further analyzed.
 
Several items of federal costs are uncontrollable.
 
These costs are known in advance and are usually determined
 
by statutes and laws. Aside from the fact that transfer
 
payments which are made out'of trust funds constitute over
 
30 percent of total budget expenditure, there are within the
 
general fund several kinds of uncontrollable costs. Accord
 
ing to Weidehbaum:
 
In addition to the trust funds, there are numerous
 
permanent appropriations which are contained in
 
budget funds. The largest of these is the permanent
 
and indefinite appropriations for the payment of
 
interest on the national debt. . .
 
22jy[urray L. Weidenbaum, "Budget 'Uncontrollability'
 
as an Obstacle to Improving the Allocation of Government
 
Resources," quoted in Robert T. Golembiewski and Jack Rabin,
 
Public Budgeting and Finance Readings in Theory and Practice,
 
2nd ed. (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publ., Inc., 1975),
 
p. 30. See Appendix F, which shows the actual and estimated
 
interest paid from 1976 to 1978 in relation to the total
 
outlays in billions of dollars.
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In addition to the interest payment, other uncon
 
trollable costs include the partially completed programs
 
and fixed charges, other than interest, such as public
 
assistance programs and veteran compensation and pension
 
payments/ Certain costs may also be incurred under certain
 
national emergencies or where there is an international
 
crisis that requires the federal government to act in one
 
way or another.
 
Where costs are relatively known and determined in
 
advance and where they are somewhat uncontrollable, there is
 
little that accrued accounting can offer. In situations
 
of emergency, cost information is not significant
 
since the primary objective is to remedy the situation as'
 
soon as possible regardless of the cost involved.
 
: Another related problem is the confusion about the
 
real objective of the accrual method. The President's
 
Commission on Budget Concepts emphasized the expenditure
 
accrual as a valid measurement of economic impact of
 
federal operations. Morse maintained that:
 
The primary reason for urging adoption of the
 
accrual basis for reporting expenditures was to
 
obtain a better periodic measure of the economic
 
impact of federal expenditures than is produced
 
by any of the three budgets now in use.^
 
The Commission dealt with the question of cost as
 
if it were a by-product or of secondary importance to the
 
^^Ellsworth H. Morse, Jr., "Reporting Budget Expendi
 
tures on the Accrual Basis The_J^^eraT_Acco^ 16
 
(December 1967):19-33.
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accrued expenditure as it stated in part: "The accrual 
concept for budget purposes will■foster the concept of 
cost control in all agencies. As mentioned earlier, 
some intellectuals criticized the concept of accrued 
expenditure and felt that it was inadequate as compared to 
accrued costs. 
At any rate, when federal agencies accrue expendi 
tures, they feel that they are complying with a major 
recommendation. 
On the question of revenue, theoretically and prac- . 
tically, an agency's revenue is simply what is allocated to 
it through the budgetary process which, in turn, is a 
political process~as demonstrated earlier. The revenue 
generated is not a result of performing the activities or 
providing services in government. As a matter of fact, the 
reverse is exactly true. The revenue is allocated first, 
based on national priorities; and then services are provided 
and expenditures are incurred within the limitation of this 
allocation. Further, there are difficulties in accruing 
revenue .according to the President's Commission on Budget 
Concepts, which stated in part: 
The Commission recognizes that the problems are 
somewhat greater in implementing its accrual recom 
mendation in the case of receipts than for expendi 
tures. . . . The Federal government currently has no 
accounting system from which accurate measures of 
^'^Report of the President's Commission on Budget 
Cone epts, p. 41. 
1 
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the accrued tax liabilities of the private sector
 
may be extracted. At present, the Treasury only has
 
: this information when tax returns are compiled and
 
tax payments are actually made by the taxpayer.
 
The doramission recognizes that this problem makes
 
it impossible to irapiement, at this time, accruing all
 
tax revenues. The estimation problems of tax accrual
 
are greatest for the individual income and employment
 
. taxes-.­
Individual income (and employment) taxes . . .
 
cannot easily be placed fully on an accrual basis.
 
It would be difficult to estimate precisely at earlier
 
dates the aggregate tax liability for all of the more
 
than 60,000,000 individuals who file their final
 
returns at a later date. The Commission, however,
 
recommended accruing corporate income taxes basically
 
because "Legislation requiring more current reporting
 
and payment of estimated taxes has substantially
 
reduced time lags between accrual of corporation tax
 
liabilities and the payment of corporation income
 
taxes. Nevertheless these time lags can still be ,
 
quite significant. . . .
 
Thus, the accrual method of accounting falls short
 
of measuring accurate revenue figures because of the incapa
 
bility of accruing a substantial portion of receipts that
 
account for, let alone individual income tax, approximately
 
40 percent of total receipts.
 
Taken together, hoth revenues and costs in accrual
 
accounting will suffer another failure; namely, the matching
 
principle which in itself is a major premise upon which the
 
accrual method is predicated. Since government activities
 
and services are not, by their very nature, revenue producing
 
and since the government can function under deficit, surplus
 
or a balanced budget, there tends to be no relation between
 
^^Ibid., pp. 43-45.
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its revenues and its costs.|; Hence, matching revenues and
 
expenses cannot be achieved.;
 
On the question of icssetSj, both accrual, and cash ,
 
methods of accounting dictaiie that tangible assets are
 
recorded at cost. Here, the; cost under both methods is the
 
actual price paid to acquir^ the asset. Currently, information
 
. ■ ■ • , ' ■ ■ i' , ' ■ , • 
on funds obligated for the piurchase of assets by the federal 
government is available thrqiugh the "object class analysis"
 
since assets are charged to ||a specific account code.
 
Additionally, the special-ari:alysis of the federal budget gives
 
detailed information on, and a distinction between, invest
 
ment, operating, and other b'udget outlays. Another analysis
 
provides for federal public jiworks activities.
 
Further, it is diffiibult if not impossible to measure
 
some assets of the federal ^bvernment, not only because they
 
. . ■ j| . ^ . . . ; . ■ ■ 
are intangible but sometimesj when they are tangible also.
 
In these instances, the acctiial method is no better than
 
the cash basis. According t|b the Advisory Committee on
 
Federal Consolidated Financilbl Statements:
 
. . -. certain intangible and unmeasurable attributes
 
exist with respect to the federal government. For
 
example, the taxing power of a government is an asset.
 
It is difficult, however, to place a value on this
 
attribute. Similarly, the federal government owns
 
various properties such as the Washington Monument,
 
the Lincoln I^bmorial, etc., that have no ready market
 
value. . . .
 
The business concept of an asset breaks down in
 
unexpected ways when applied to the federal government.
 
Some of the nation's most cherished assets provide
 
hone of the usefulness of business assets. They
 
cannot be converted to other forms, used to produce
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revenues or applied against debts. Indeed, commit
 
ments to maintain certain assets such as monuments
 
and historic sites represent: cohtinuing obligations
 
more in the nature of iiabilities.
 
The financial condition of the federal govern
 
ment depends primarily on an "asset" that cannot be
 
booked in any meaningful way. . . . .
 
On , the ^ question of liabilities, TierneY. SLud. Hoffman
 
maintained that: ,
 
generally, there is no significant difference between
 
the obligation, accrued expenditure, costs and checks
 
issued when the transaction is incurred and settled
 
immediately. For example, the time difference
 
between incurring an obligation for employee salaries
 
and benefits and paying this obligation could be
 
relatively short and be of little consequence in any
 
agency's accounting or reporting.
 
The same view was expressed by the President's Commission
 
on Budget Concepts in 1967, except that it mentioned the
 
occasional "humps" that result from the biweekly structure
 
of the federal government.
 
As there are problems in measuring assets, there
 
are also problems in measuring liability. The federal gov
 
ernment is under moral obligations to continue certain
 
programs and to create others to meet both national and
 
international goals. To attempt to place a dollar value on
 
such commitments under the accrual method is going to be
 
far from accurate. Thus, information will be both meaningless
 
and useless.
 
.S., The Advisory Committee on Federal Consolidated
 
Financial Statements, Recommendations to the Secretary Of
 
the Treasury (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,
 
1976), pp. 11-30. v.- ^
 
^"^Tierney and Hoffman, pp. 90-91.
 
Further, the government has the power to discontinue
 
certain programs and relinquish its obligation in specific
 
areas. It becoimds misleading then, to say at one point of
 
time, the government is liable to pay a certain amount to
 
meet its obligations since at any point of time the govern
 
ment can reduce or even conceal its liabilities.
 
On the question of hettev decision making as a
 
result of the better information generated through accrual
 
accounting, it was demonstrated that accrual accounting is
 
not going to produce such "better information" in many situa
 
tions. Also, this argument implies that programs will be
 
decided upon in light of this improved information. This is
 
really far from the truth because national priorities are
 
determined throughout the budgetary process and, accordingly,
 
programs are executed. Stated differently, accounting
 
information is not the decisive factor for decisions related
 
to programs; but the determination of national priorities,
 
which is strictly a political process, is the key element in
 
making decisions related to programs.
 
Another implication of this argument is that govern
 
ment decisions are based solely on economic rationality
 
where the best alternative, and consequently the best
 
decision, is selected in terms of costs and benefits or is
 
selected where it yields a higher return on investment if
 
compared with other alaternatives. In government, economic
 
rationality is easily said than exercised in practice.
 
 ■ ; ■ : ; :'v ■ , 
In addition tp the problems ;of calculating true hnd accurate
 
costs, benefits are difficult to measure; and in choosing
 
among programs there is no way to say, for example, that
 
the dollar spent on national defense yields a higher return
 
to investment than the dollar spent on a health program.
 
Economic rationality in government is extremely hampered by
 
the intangible and imnieasurable goals and benefits which are
 
sought by the government. Within the political environment'
 
of government, political rationality and political costs and
 
benefits are supreme to economic rationality and economic
 
costs and benefits. According to Diesing:
 
Political rationality is the fundamental kind
 
of reason because it deals with the preservation
 
and improvement of decision structures, and decision
 
structures are the source of all decisions. The
 
political problem is always basic and prior to the
 
others. This means that any suggested course of
 
action must be evaluated first by its effects on
 
the political structure. A course of action which
 
corrects economic or social deficiencies but
 
increases political difficulties must be rejected,
 
while an action which contributes to political
 
improvement is desirable even if it is not entirely
 
sound from an economic or social standpoint.
 
On political costs and benefits, Wildavsky maintained
 
that "in a political situation, the need for support assumes
 
central importance. Not simply the economic, but the
 
political costs and benefits turn out to be crucial."
 
2^Paul Diesing, "Reason in Society," quoted in Aaron
 
Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency; Cost-Benefit
 
Analysis, Systems Analysis and Program Budgeting," Public
 
Administration Review 26 (December 1966):292-307.
 
^^Ibid., p. 307.
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When leaders promote certain programs or try to get a policy
 
adopted, they will need the support of the power base (i.e.,
 
interest groups. Congress members, and electorate). Since iio
 
one measure can satisfy everyone, certain costs are going to
 
be incurred, and which take the form of opposition and hos
 
tility on the part of other interest groups, Congress members,
 
and electorate. For the politician, the cost is too high
 
when he loses the election. Under political rationality, it
 
is very important to maintain a balance; and it is very
 
important to compromise since a 100 percent political benefit
 
(support) is difficult, and political costs (opposition and
 
losing election) are too high for a politician to stand.
 
Diesing best illustrated this by stating;
 
. . . Non-political decisions are reached by con
 
sidering a problem in its own terms, and by evaluat
 
ing proposals according to how well they solve the
 
problem. The best available proposal should be
 
accepted regardless of who makes it or who opposes
 
it, or a faulty proposal should be rejected or
 
improved no matter who makes it. Compromise is
 
always irrational; the rational procedure is to
 
determine which proposal is the best, and to accept
 
it. In a political decision, on the other hand,
 
action never is based on the merits of a proposal
 
but always on who makes it and who opposes it.
 
Action should be designed to avoid complete identi
 
fication with any proposal and any point of view,
 
no matter how good or how popular it might be. The
 
best available proposal should never be accepted just
 
because it is best; it should be deferred, objected
 
to, discussed, until major opposition disappears.
 
Compromise is always a rational procedure, even when
 
the compromise is between a good and a bad proposal.
 
^^Ibid.
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No matter^then^how good the accrual accounting
 
information, it: is less likely that a decision will be based
 
on it. ComprQihise, or political rationality, is the pattern
 
as well as the rule of making decisions in government. As a
 
result of compromise, the political apparatus functions well,
 
conflict is reduced among political rivals, and political
 
costs are reduced while political benefits are increased.
 
This, in turn, provides a healthy political structure within
 
the frame of Which other decisions are made.
 
Further, to say that accrual accounting is important
 
for the decision making in government seems more theoretical
 
than practicali The decision-making process in government
 
is dispersed due to the division of powers and the principle
 
of checks and balances among the three branches of government.
 
There.is no one single entity that has the ultimate power to
 
make decisions over the various issues. Information has to
 
be presented to those who participate in the decision-making
 
process. It becomes inevitable that various interests will
 
be introduced; different interpretation as to what the
 
figures mean will, be provided; and discussions, arguments,
 
and debates will take place. The end result will be a
 
decision which consaders various interests and viewpoints
 
(i.e., a compromise).
 
As a matter of fact, the pattern of decision-making
 
process in government is a manifestation of power relation
 
ships within a frame of political power structure. It is not
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likely that accrual information will change that pattern of
 
decisioh makingv; This is because the change in the pattern
 
of decision making requires first a change in power relation
 
ships which, in turn, entails an alteration of the present
 
power structure. ' :
 
In addition, it is a well known principle in govern
 
ment that legal cpmp'liance has a priority over accounting
 
principle. Federal agencies have to comply with the statutes
 
and the laws governing their operations even when they contra
 
dict with accpUnting principles. This, of course, has an
 
impact pn producing reliable accounting information in the
 
professionar sehse. Whether this principle of legal com
 
pliance is good pr bad is iimaterial. What is important is
 
that it is a: reality that should be recognized.
 
■ Finally, many decisions in government are based on 
qualitative information which are not related at all to 
accounting or any other quantitative information. For 
example, the national defense budget could be determined 
on the basis of reports and information on the Soviet 
military power. Foreign aid programs could be determined 
in light of international relations considerations. 
In summary, the information derived from the accrual
 
accounting cannot be regarded as a major source of informa
 
tion which provides the basis of decision making in
 
government. The political nature of government has a
 
tendency to place accounting information at a lower level
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of importance than that enjoyed in the private sector organi­
■zationsi' . , 'h;i / 
Experience of the Private Sector Organizations 
; Advocates of the accrual method in government main 
tain that on the basis of the excellent record of accrual 
accounting in the private sector organizations, government 
organizations should adopt it in order to obtain better 
information which, in turn, I will lead to better decisions. 
This, in turn, will: make go^iernment more efficient and as 
effective as private organizations. 
Perhaps the easiest argument against this view is 
its failure to recognize the differences between the political 
environment of government organizations as compared with the 
economic erivironitient:of priyate organizations. While there 
is a high degfee of dependence between government and busi 
ness, the fact that they are different from each other should 
not be overlooked. As stated earlier, they aire different in 
terms of goals,, environment, operation, and decision making. 
Another argument is that, from a systems standpoint, 
what seems beneficial a:nd fruitful to one organization will 
not necessarily be beneficial and fruitful for another 
organization. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
The federal government is a complex political organi
 
zation which lies at the heart of the political structure
 
and seeks the achievement of a multitude of complex, comple
 
mentary, and siorrietimes conflicting, intangible goals. No
 
one single word or phrase can best describe what government
 
is all about or what its objectives are. The objectives are
 
dynamic and immeasurable and usually cross national borders.
 
There are difficulties in measuring the cost of its programs.
 
The benefits derived out of these programs do not lend them
 
selves to measurement. There is no correlation between the
 
volume or nature of its activities and the revenue generated
 
through taxes. The former is determined on political grounds
 
which coincide with the needs and goals of the nation as a
 
whole, rather than being based on cost. This is best exempli
 
fied in the ability, and sometimes even as an intended goal,
 
of the government to operate under a deficit or surplus
 
budget. The dacision-making process is incremental, frag
 
mented throughdut the political power structure, and is
 
characterized with political rationality rather than being
 
influenced with economic rationality and quantitative data.
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Political decision itiaking in government is the net
 
product of political support, debate, argument, and negotia
 
tion. Political costs and benefits, which are not amenable
 
to measurement/ are weighed carefully and become key variables
 
in the decision-making process. These represent crucial
 
points of departure from the private sector organizations
 
whose goals can be summed up in one word—profit. Such a
 
goal is easily?measurable. Matching their revenues with
 
their costs is quite possible. Their decision-making process
 
is based primarily on economic rationality. Their existence
 
is justified only to the extent of their ability to make a
 
profit. They cannot function under deficit (loss) conditions.
 
The political environment and the political decision-

making process?in government place colossal limitations on
 
what accrual abcounting can offer. Neither will it help in
 
matching revenues and expenses, nor will it achieve accurate
 
cost measurerrient under present political structure and inter
 
governmental relations. ' In other instances, where salaries,
 
wages, and employee benefits constitute the majority of an
 
agency's expense, it is not even worth adopting. Most
 
importantly, it is not going to change the political pattern
 
of decision making in government. In cases of national or
 
international emergencies, accrual accounting information
 
is goin.g to be absolutely irrelevant and will not even be
 
considered.
 
Zealot advocates for the accrual method in government.
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who seem to have oversold their case, must be aware of such
 
limitations. AS Professor Wildavsky:eminently and realis
 
tically put it: "In social research (indeed, more in social
 
action), it is as important to know what can't be done as
 
what can. . . .
 
The fact that accrual accounting is widely accepted
 
and is extremely successful in the private sector, in
 
addition to being a cherished accounting method by profes
 
sional accountants, is not enough to justify its adoption
 
in government where there are severe limitations which make
 
its usefulness questionable.
 
Accrual accounting is economically oriented and is
 
a powerful tooi in the economic decision-making process. Yet,
 
when decisions are not basically economic, but rather are
 
primarily political, accrual accounting tends to lose much of
 
its power as a: tool iu the ^ ecision-making process. Hence,
 
its usefulness is limited and its adoption becomes questionable,
 
This is precisely the case with the accrual method of account
 
ing in government.
 
Its record in the federal government speaks for
 
itself. After,thirty years, it is only sporadically adopted
 
and there is little assurance, if any at all, that it has
 
produced significant results where applied.
 
^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary
 
Process, 2nd ed (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, Inc.,
 
1974), p. x. ■ ; ■ ■
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,In short, the political realm of government is far
 
beyond the reach of accrual accounting which has never been
 
geared towards solving political problems. This is not to
 
build a case against accrual accounting, but this is simply
 
to say that it is not compatible with, nor is it useful for,
 
the general fund operations of the federal government.
 
Accrual accounting and political decisions are not compatible,
 
As a matter of fact, the recognition of the modified
 
accrual basis as an acceptable accounting practice is by
 
implication a recognition that full accrual, as practiced in
 
the private sector, is not compatible with government opera
 
tions.
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APPENDIX A .
 
BUD®T RECEIMS, OUTLAYS, AND DEBT, 1970-79 (in billions of dollars)
 
Actual .. Estimate
 
1977; - 1973 :;,1979
19701 1971- 1972 if :1973 1974 ■ 1975>: 1976 .;,TQ. 
12
 
Receipts & Outlays:'
 
Receipts:
 
54.0 240.;4 267.9 289.1
Federal funds 143.2 133.8 148.8 161.4 181.2 187.5 200.3
 
168,5 188.0

Trust funds : 59.4 66.2 '73.0 92.2 104.8 118.6 133.7 32.1 152.8
 
-21.3 ;,^21.1 -25.1 -34.8 -4.4 -56.3 -36.0 -37,5
Interfund trans. , ■ -8.8 -11.6 - -13,2;
 
Total budget ^
 
299:2" 81;7 A356v9:':^100.4"" -439.6
receipts 193.T V188.4 208.6 232.2 "l64.9 281.0"
 
H-'
 
o
 
00 Outlays: .
 
65.0 294.9, 340.0 363.6
187.0 199.9 240.0 269.1
Federal funds 156.3 •163.7 178.1
 
111.2 131.3 34.0 143.3 158.2 174.1
 Trust funds 49.1 59.4 67.1 81.4 90.8
 
Interfund trans. -8.8 -11.6
 -13.2 -21.3 -21.1 -25.1 -34.8 -4.4 -36,3 -36.0 -37.5
 
Total budget
 
365.6 94.7 401.9 . 462.2 ^ 500.2
outlays 196.6 211.4 232.0 247.1 269.6 326.1
 
Outlays, off-budget ^ r-v
 
Federal entities (...) (...) (...) (.1) (1.4) (8.1) (7.2) (1.8) (8.7) ( .) ( • )
 
Outlays including
 
2tiS£^^ (196.6) (211.4) (232.0) (247.1) ;(271.1) (334.1) (372.9) (96.4) (410.6) (473.7) (512.7)

Surplus or deficit(-): r _
 
Federal funds -13.1 -29.9 -29.3 -25.6 -18.7 -52.5 -68.9 -11.0 -54. • *(,

Trust funds 10.3 6.8 5.9 10.7 14.0 7.4 2.4 2.0 9.5 10.3 13.9
 
Total surplus or v--, o rt\ n
 
deficit (-) - 2.8 -23vQ -23.4 -14.8 - 4.7 -45.1 -66.4 -13.0 -45.0 -61.8 -60.6
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Actual 	 - . P : Estimate
 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 IQ 1977 1978 1979
 
Surplus or deficit {-),
 
off-budget Federal
 
entities 	 (-.1) (-1.4) (-8.1) (-7.2) (-1,8) (-8.7) (-11.5) (-12,5)
 
•	 Surplus or deficit (-),
 
inclijding off-budget
 
Federal entities ( -2.8) (-23.0) (-23.4) (-14.9) (-6.1) (-53,1) (-73.7) (-14,7)(-53.7) (-73.4) (-73.1)
 
Outstanding debt/ 
end of year 
Gross Federal debt 382.6 409.5 437.3 468.4 486.2 544.1 631.9 646.4 709.1 . 785.6 873.7 
' Held by; 
Gov. agencies 97.7 105.1 113.6 125.4 140.2 147.2 151.6 148.1 157.3 167.7 182.8 
The public 284.9 304.3 323.8 343.0 346.1 396.9 480.3 498.3 551.8 617.8 690.8 
Federal reserve 
system 57.7 65.5 71.4 75.2 80.6 85.0 94.7 96.7 105.0 NA : NA 
; Others . 227.2 238.8 252.3 267.9 265.4 311.9 385.6 ; 401.6 446.8 na: NA 
NA - Not available.
 
^The amounts of earned incone credit in excess of tax liabilities are shown as negative budget receipts
 
rather than as budget outlays. Accordingly, the budget totals have been adjusted retroactively.
 
^The 1975-77 data have been revised retroactively to include the housing for the elderly or handicapped
 
fund in the unified budget instead of with the off-budget Federal entities.
 
SOURCE: U.S., The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, B.C.: Government ^ 
Printing Office, 1978), p. 73. ■ ' g 
 : M>PE1SDIX B
 
TIMING Of THE RECORDING OF PURCHASE OF MATERIALS
 
tiNDER ACCRUAL METHOD OF ACCOUNTING
 
Recorded in Accounting Records in Month
 
in Which ; ^
 
Materials 
Order : are Materials Bill 
Transaction is placed delivered are used is paid 
Placing an
 
order for
 
materials ,, As an
 
obligation
 
Materials
 
delivered . As an
 
accrued
 
expenditure
 
Materials used
 
or consumed an
As 

applied
 
cost
 
Payment made .
 
for materials
 As a
 
disbursement
 
of cash
 
SOURCE: U.Si, General Accounting Office/ Frequently Asked Questions
 
About Accrual Accpunting in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C,:
 
Govemraent Printing Office, 1970), p. 5.
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APPENDIX C
 
ACTUAL AND ESTIMAIED COSTS FOR SELECTED PROGRAMS WITHIN
 
SELECTED DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMEaSlT
 
(Program and Financing on thousands of dollars)
 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
 
Departmental Administration
 
Identification Code ­
12-0120-0-1-352 1977 actiaal 1978 est. 1979 est.
 
Program by activities:
 
Direct program:^ p
 
1. Budget, planning
 
and evaluation .1 .. , 2,754 2,892 2,925
 
2. Operations and
 
finance .. . ..... 3,253 2,918 2,951
 
3. Personnel ...... . 2,245 2,298 2,343
 
4. Equal opportunity ... 1,937 1,551 1,553
 
5. Governmental and
 
public affairs ... . . 3,526 5,406 6,928
 
Total direct
 
program ....... ; 13,715 15,065 16,700
 
Reimbursable program:
 
1. Budget, planning .
 
and evaluation .... . 7 7 

2. Operations and
 
finance . ........ 1,947 1,191 1,191
 
3. Personnel ....... 788 826 826
 
4. Governmental and
 
public affairs . . ... 858 489 489
 
Total reimbursable .
 
program ..... .. 3,600 2,513 2,513
 
Total program costs, 
fundedl ...... 17,314 17,578 19,213 
Change in selected resources 
(undelivered orders) .... ' 89 .... ■ 
Total obligations . . . 17,403 17,578 19,213 
Financing: 
Offsetting collections from: 
Federal funds ....... -3,588 -2,513 -2,513 
Non-federal sources ... . - 12 ... 
Unobligated balance 
lapsing .......... 1,006 
Budget authority ... 14,809 15,065 16,700 
^Includes capital investment as follows: 1977, $132 thousand;
 
1978, $70 thousand; 1979, $70 thousand.
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DEPAKTMENT OF ENEPGY 
Departmental Operations 
Identifieation Code 
89-0201-0-^1-053 1977 actual 1978 est. 1979 est. 
Program by activities: 
Direct program bperating 
costs, funded: 
1. Inertial confinement 
fusion . ,. ... ... 75,879 96,300 92,800 
2. Naval reactor 
development ..... 205,086 223,692 241,100 
3. Weapons activities .. ., 946,363 1,079,575 1,195,594 
4. Intelligence and 
arms con-trol ...... 18,756 23,325 27,400 
5. Special materials 
production ....... 349,964 400,744 476,400 
6. Nuclear materials 
. security and 
safeguards ....... 23,421 . 33,578 35,089 
Total operating 
costs, funded .. . .. 1,619,469 1,857,214 2,068,383 
Change in selected 
resources (undelivered 
orders) ' ....... .■ . . . 85,189 87,335 91,700 
Total operating 
obligations . . . . . 1,704,658 1,944,549 2,160,083 
Capital investment, funded: 
1. Inertial confinemoiit 
; : :fusion t .■ . .. 23,534 25,893 29,200 
2. Naval -reactor 
development . . . . . , . . 34,142 28,075 21,000 
3. Weapon activities 
5. Special materials 
. . . 149,600 191,314 191,050 
production 103,942 202,146 223,200 
6. Nuclear niaterials 
security and 
safeguards . . . ' . . .: . 
Total capital investment 
5,093 . 3,123 3,000 
funded . . - 316,311 450,551 467,450 
Change in selected resources 
(undelivered orders) . . . . 104,286 129,728 46,750 
Total capital invest 
ment, obligations . . 420,597 580,279 514,200 
Total, direct 
program . . . . . . . 2,125,255 2,524,828 2,674,283 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (Continued)
 
Identification Code
 
89-0201-0-1-053 1977 actual 1978 est. 1979 est.
 
Reimbursable program:
 
1. Naval reactor
 
development .. . ... 194,891 194,601 287,400 
2. Weapons activities: 
a. National security-
manufacture of 
weapons parts of 
assemblies for 
DOD .... . . .. 37,761 40,104 47,800 
b. Weapons testing 
support for DOD .. 43,158 37,450 39,100 
c. Weapons research 
and development 
for DOD .. . . . . 60,190 24,881 79,500 
Total reimbursable 
program costs . . .. 336,000 297,036 453,800 
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
 
= Food and Drug Administration
 
Identification Code
 
73-060Q-0-1-554 1977 actual 1978 est, 1979 est.
 
Program by activities:
 
Direct program;
 
1. Foods ... ...... 79,396 87,718 85,188
 
2. Drugs & Devices .... 98,614 128,285 135,290
 
3. Radiological Prod . ,. 18,099 20,262 20,489
 
4. National Center for
 
Toxicological Res ... 12,947 13,866 13,974
 
5. Program management .. 32,460 38,579 39,363
 
Total direct
 
program ...... . 241,516 288,710 294,304
 
Reimbursable program .... 1,582 3,000 3,000
 
Total program costs,
 
funded^ . . . .... 243,098 291,710 297,304
 
Change in selected resources
 
(undelivered orders) ... 8,248 ... •••
 
Total obligations .. 251,526 291,710 297,304
 
Financing: ;
 
Offsetting collections
 
from Federal funds .. .. -1,582 -3,000 -3,000
 
Unobligated balance
 
lapsing . ., .i:. .... . 75
 
Budget authority . .. 250,019 288,710 294,304
 
Budget authority:
 
Appropriation . 250,019 276,243 294,304
 
Transferred to other
 
accounts . ,. ... ... ... -23 ♦••
 
Appropriation
 
(adjusted) ... .... 250,019 276,220 294,304
 
Supplemental now
 
requested for wageboard
 
. pay raises . . . ... .. .i. 248
 
Supplemental now
 
requested for civilian
 
pay raises ..,.. . . . .... 11,394
 
Supplemental now
 
requested for military
 
pay raises . .,...... ... 848
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (Continued)
 
Identification Code
 
73-0600-0-1-554 1977 Actual 1978 est. 1979 est.
 
Relation of obligations
 
to outlays:
 
Obligations incurred, net .. 249,943 288,710 294,304
 
Obligated balance, start
 
of year 51,930 56,358 63,734
 
Obligated balance, end of
 
year ... . . . . . . ... -56,358 -63,734 -65,074
 
Adjustments in
 
expired accounts . ..... - 3,998 ...
 
Outlays, exluding
 
pay raise supplemental. . 241,517 269,094 292,714
 
Outlays from wageboard
 
pay raise
 
supplemental .. . . . . ... 243 5
 
Outlays from civilian
 
pay raise supplemental. . ... 11,149 245
 
Outlays from military
 
pay raise supplemental. . ... 848 ...
 
Note: Exludes $1,440 thousand in 1979 transferred to "General
 
departmental management." Comparable amomts for 1978 ($1,440 thousand)
 
and 1977 ($1,440 thousand) are included above.
 
^IncliJdes capital investment as follows: 1977, $10 thousand;
 
1978, $7 thousand; 1979, $8 thousand.
 
SOURCE: U.S., Appendix to the Budget, Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington,
 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).
 
  
 
 
 
. APPENDIX D
 
PER(3M[AGE OF FUNDS OBLIGATED FOR GRANTS, SUBSIDIES,. AND, GONTRIBUTIONS
 
TO TOTAL.OBLIGATIONS FOR SELECTED AGENCIES •
 
(in millions of dollars)
 
1975 Actual
 1977 Estimated 19,78 Estimated
 
Tl.Obl. . Grt.Sub.s Tl.Obl. Grt.Sub.& Tl.Obl. Grt.Sub.&
 
Q. ■ . o.Inc. Contr. Q. Inc. Contr. "o ■ Inc. Contr."O
 
Department of 
Acjriculture 24898 9409 38.0 30088 7 9348 31.0 : 26671 9640 V 36.0 
.Department of 
Gorrrnerce ,' -
.'. ■ ■■ / 
;2493 1230 V:'.." ^ ■ 49.0 4521 ' 2949 65.0 2418 . 815 ' : 34.0 
CTl Department of 
HEW. 42229 35720 85,0 54096 ,45453'7 84.0 54836 V , 47863 87.0 : 
Department of 
Housing and 
Urban Develop. 39719 29716 : 75.0 33899 26457 78.0 33829 28545 . V 84.0 
Department of 
Labor 17087 7435 44.0 13777 7258 53.0 10183 5867 58.0 
Environmental 
Prot. Agency 4999 4522 90.0 7423 6361 86.0 6155 1443 23.0 
Tl.Obi.Inc. - Total Obligations Incurred.
 
Grt.Sub.& Contr. - Grants,Subsidies and Contributions.
 
SOURCE: U.S., Office of Management, and Budget, Object Class Analysis—Budget for Fiscal Year 1978
 
  
 
 
 
  
. APPENDIX E
 
PERCENTAGE .OF FUNDS OBLIGATED -FOR PERSONNEL SERVICES
 
TO TOTAL OBLIGATIONS
 
(in millions of dollars)
 
1976 Actual 1977 EstiiiHtod 1978 Estimate 
; , . . 1 ^ TOTAL TER.SEK,.&: . TOTAL. .PER.SER.& ■-/L . . TOTAL PER.SER.& 
3 Q, g. 
"o: ^ y . BENEFITS' y ;aEL.ty yBENEFlTS OBL. BEInEFITS"o 
Executive Office of the President 
■X'f .y 42:.y;0--. ' . :y 63.0 y y :/48:' 74 48 ■ y. 65.0 
Department of E)efpise lEElitary) : ; . - yy \ : .y ^ '/L ^ ' 1 
127900 45893 36.0 147842 48668 33.0 160660 ; .49397; , 31.0 
Department of Defense (Civil) 
3434 , , 753 22.0 4026 839 20.0 . 4274 y .875 21.0 
Department of, Interior 
y'3995 ; 1294 32.0 5498 1461 27.0 5549 , 1533 28.0 
APPENDIX E-—Continued
 
1976 Actual 1977 Estiinated 1978 Estimated
 
TOTAL PER.SEP.& TOTAL PER.SEP.& TOTAL PER.SER.&
 
Q, Q. a
 
"O "O "o
OBL, . BENEFITS OBL. BENEFITS OBL. BENEFITS
 
Department of Justice
 
2290 1034 45.0 2496 1144 46.0 2496 1188 . 48.0
 
Department of Transportation
 
5484 2044 37.0 8272 2280 28.0. 8206 2356 29.0
 
TOTAL OBL. - Total Obligations.
 
PER.SER.&BENEFITS - Personnel Services and Benefits.
 
SOUPGE: U.S., Office of Management and Budget, Object Class Analysis—^Budget for Fiscal Year 1978
 
(Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).­
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APPENDIX F
 
SCHEDULE OF UNCONTROLLABLE INTEREST EXPELSISE
 
(In billions of dollars)
 
Actual Estimated
 
1976 1977 1978
 
Interest Outlay 34.6 38.0 39.7
 
Total Budget Outlay 366.5 411.2 440.0
 
Trust Fund Outlay 131.3 143.3 158.2
 
Total Outlays Excluding
 
Trust Funds 235.2 267.9 291.8
 
% of Interest Outlay to
 
Total Outlay (Excluding
 
Trust Funds) 14.7 14.2 13.6
 
SOURCES: U.S., Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of the
 
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Government
 
Printing Office, 1978).
 
U.S., The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1979
 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).
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